University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2004

Bolling Alone
Richard A. Primus
University of Michigan Law School, raprimus@umich.edu

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/526

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons,
Fourteenth Amendment Commons, Law and Race Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United
States Commons
Recommended Citation
Primus, Richard A. "Bolling Alone." Colum. L. Rev. 104, no. 4 (2004): 975-1041.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

BOLLING ALONE
Richard A. Primus*
Under the doctrine of reverse incorporation,generally identified with the
Supreme Court's decision in Bolling v. Sharpe, equal protection binds the
federal government even though the Equal Protection Clause by its terms is
addressed only to states. Since Bolling, however, the courts have almost
never granted relief to litigants claiming unconstitutionalracialdiscrimination by the federal government. Courts have periodicallyfound unconstitutionalfederal discrimination on nonracialgrounds such as sex and alienage, and reverse incorporation has also limited the scope of affirmative
action. But in the presumed core area of preventingfederal discrimination
against racialminorities, Boiling has virtually no successors.
This Article proposes an explanationfor the absence of successful race
discrimination claims against the federal government. The absence, it argues, is not a function of a lack of federal discrimination. Rather, it is a
function of shared norms between the federal judiciary and the political
branches of the federal government. The federal courts and the other
branches share a view of what constitutes unconstitutional discrimination,
such that conduct the federal courts are willing to call "discriminatory"is
largely activity that the other branches do not engage in, at least not as a
matter of official policy. When federalofficers departfrom official policy and
engage in unauthorized discrimination, subconstitutionalrules created by
the other branches are sufficient to police their behavior. Accordingly, there is
little evidence that reverse incorporationhas done much independent work in
checking federal racialdiscrimination.
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INTRODUCTION

This Article is about a case, a doctrine, and a surprising fact about
our constitutional system. The case is Bolling v. Sharpe,' and the doctrine
is reverse incorporation. In Boling, decided the same day as Brown v.
Board of Education,2 the Supreme Court ruled that the District of Columbia may not segregate its public schools even though the Equal Protection Clause is addressed only to states. 3 It would be "unthinkable," the
Court declared, to hold that the Constitution imposes a lesser duty of
4
nondiscrimination on the federal government than it does on the states.
That declaration has become the keystone for the reverse incorporation
doctrine; just as the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause has
been held to incorporate provisions of the first eight amendments, 5 the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause was construed to incorporate at
least some-and later all-of the equal protection guarantee of the
6
Fourteenth.
Bolling and reverse incorporation have generally been regarded as
hard or even impossible to justify in terms of the text or the history of the
1. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § I ("IN]or shall any State . .. deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
4. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500.
5. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-57 (1961) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause incorporates the Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable search and seizure); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)
(same, for First Amendment right of free exercise of religion).
6. See infra Part I.
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Fourteenth Amendment. 7 Nonetheless, the conventional wisdom in constitutional scholarship has not concluded that Bolling is wrongly decided
or that reverse incorporation is an illegitimate doctrine. 8 Instead, the
dominant approach has been to regard Boling and reverse incorporation
as justified by the force of sheer normative necessity. 9 That claim could
mean any or all of three different things. One is that desegregating the
District's schools was itself so important as to justify departing from normal modes of legality. 10 A second is that allowing the continuing segregation of the District of Columbia's schools would have undermined the
legitimacy of Brown and perhaps made that decision unenforceable, because the Court would have appeared to be hypocritically imposing a
mandate on the states that it did not impose on the federal government.1 1 A third, which is not limited to the specific context of school
7. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 32
(1980) (describing reverse incorporation as "gibberish both syntactically and historically");
Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 Stan. L. Rev.
395, 409 (1995) (describing the "embarrassing textual gap" with which defenders of Boiling
must reckon). The syntactical problem to which Ely refers is that if "Due Process of Law"
includes equal protection, the Fourteenth Amendment's separate guarantees of due
process and equal protection are redundant. See also Lucas A. Powe Jr., The Warren
Court and American Politics 32 (2000) ("Equating the Due Process Clause and the Equal
Protection Clause .. .was nothing short of stunning."). The historical problem is that a
text ratified in 1791 cannot "incorporate" a text written in 1868. A few leading scholars
have risen to this interpretive challenge, offering creative ways to derive Boling and reverse
incorporation from the constitutional text. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism,
112 Harv. L. Rev. 747, 766-71 (1999) (defending Boling as correctly decided under the
Citizenship Clause, the Bill of Attainder Clause, or the Titles of Nobility Clause); Lessig,
supra, at 408-10 (arguing that Boling properly recognized that Reconstruction values
altered the meaning of "due process"). Others, however, have regarded ventures like these
as unpersuasive apologetics. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, What Does the Second
Amendment Mean Today?, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 291, 326 (2000) ("Clever lawyers can
concoct all sorts of arguments for why Boling is no more problematic than Brown.").
8. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 2062, 2365 (2002)
(describing Boling as "universally accepted").
9. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Fourteenth Amendment, 25 Loy. L.A. L. Rev.
1159, 1162 n.14 (1992) ("As a matter of judicial statecraft, the imperative in Bolling was
clear.").
10. This idea could encompass both the moral imperatives of desegregation for the
children attending school in the District and the strategic imperatives, early in the Cold
War, of eliminating an international public relations disaster. Many nonwhite diplomats
from nonaligned countries worked in or passed through the District of Columbia, and any
racial segregation there impeded American attempts to present the United States as
representing the global causes of democracy and human rights. See Mary L. Dudziak,
Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy 96-99 (2000).
11. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 9, at 1162 n.14 ("If the Court had allowed the
federal government to continue to segregate its schools the apparent hypocrisy would have
made Brown all the more unenforceable."). This justification for Boling is routine and
even canonical, which is remarkable in light of its serious historical weaknesses. There is
no evidence that Boling bolstered the Court's legitimacy among Brown's opponents,
causing Southern segregationists to abandon or moderate their opposition to the Court's
decrees. Resistance to Brown was massive and violent, see, e.g., Michael Klarman, From Jim
Crow to Civil Rights 344-442 (2004), and there is no record of Southerners acknowledging
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desegregation, is that preventing the federal government from engaging
in racial discrimination is simply important enough to justify a strong judicial misreading. 12 The first two of these ideas concern Boling more
specifically, and the third is bound up with reverse incorporation more
broadly. This Article focuses on the third idea.
Few doubt that federal racial discrimination is normatively intolerable, but it does not follow that reverse incorporation has been necessary
to prevent it. The surprising fact that this Article analyzes is that the reverse incorporation doctrine is almost never applied to protect members
of minority groups against racial discrimination. Since Bolling, the Supreme Court has never declared a federal statute or regulation unconstitutional on the grounds that it discriminates against members of a racial
minority group. Nor has the Court ever invalidated any other kind of
federal action on those grounds. The Court has never found that a federal prosecutor impermissibly struck ajuror from a venire on account of
race, that a federal law enforcement officer engaged in unconstitutional
racial discrimination against criminal suspects, or that a federal employer
fired an employee for unconstitutional racial reasons. This does not
mean that reverse incorporation has had no progeny at all. In an important develoment decades after 1954, the courts have invoked Bolling to
limit the use of affirmative action) 3 Courts have also struck down federal
measures as unconstitutionally discriminatory in nonracial contexts like
sex 1 4 and alienage.' 5 But in the Supreme Court's decisions with respect
that at least they had to respect the Court's adherence to a consistent principle. On the
contrary, some segregationists marshaled the doctrinal unorthodoxy of Boling as evidence
of the Court's runaway lawlessness. See 1957 Ga. Laws 553, 560 (calling for the
impeachment of several United States Supreme Court Justices, and adducing Bolling's
innovative reading of the Due Process Clause as an example of the Justices' illegal
propensity to privilege their own desired outcomes over established constitutional
principles). These complaints do not mean that Boling aggravated Southern resistance-it
seems more likely that Brown's opponents simply seized on any convenient ammunition
with which to attack the Court. But this use of Boliing, together with the fact that virtually
no desegregation was accomplished in the Deep South until the mid-1960s, see Klarman,
supra, at 363, suggests that it is fanciful to think that Bolling had any significant power to
persuade segregationists to accept the ruling in Brown.
12. See Eskridge, supra note 8, at 2365-66 (grouping Boling with Brown and Lovingv.
Virginia as cases whose broad normative force is more powerful than the demands of
proper method in constitutional interpretation). Robert Bork, an otherwise steadfast
originalist, maintained that he would not dream of overruling Bolling even though he
could not justify it on originalist grounds. See Hearings on the Nomination of Robert H.
Bork to Be Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 83-84, 287-88, 351 (1987).
13. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 215-17 (1995) (relying on
reverse incorporation to subject federal racial classifications to the same strict scrutiny that
applies to parallel state laws); see also id. ("Bolling's facts concerned school desegregation,
but its reasoning was not so limited.").
14. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688-91 (1973) (invalidating
military regulation presuming that male service members, but not female service members,
needed to provide financial support for their spouses).
15. See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 116-17 (1976) (holding that
aliens may not be categorically barred from civil service employment); Schneider v. Rusk,
HeinOnline -- 104 Colum. L. Rev. 978 2004
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to the heartland of equal protection-the defense of racial minority
groups against governmental discrimination-reverse incorporation has
been a rule for Bolling alone.
The situation is similar in the lower courts, despite their immensely
larger caseload. In the fifty years since 1954, there have been only a
dozen reported cases in which African American litigants claiming racial
discrimination by any branch or officer of the federal government have
obtained relief from any court on constitutional grounds, and on only
two or three of those occasions has reverse incorporation been necessary
for redressing the discrimination at issue. 16 Many judgments are unreported and many cases settle before judgment, so these cases are
probably not the only instances in which reverse incorporation has had
legal force. Nonetheless, the extremely small volume of judgments
against the government suggests the limited extent of reverse incorporation's broader effects.
This Article analyzes the absence ofjudicial decisions finding unconstitutional federal discrimination against racial minority groups after Bolling. The best explanation for that absence, it argues, is a matter of
shared federal norms. At any given time, the courts are not likely to regard the activities of the other branches as unconstitutionally discriminatory, because the judiciary's view of impermissible racial discrimination
more or less tracks the other branches' views of normatively unacceptable
conduct.
For much of American history, the federal government practiced
overt and official racial discrimination, as in the segregation of the military and the civil service.1 7 Those practices would violate equal protection if undertaken today. Prior to the middle of the twentieth century,
however, courts interpreted equal protection to permit segregation, and
therefore would have upheld these practices even if equal protection had
applied to the federal government. Then, in the years around World War
II, federal practices began to change. A new set of racial norms arose,
and federal segregation began to give way-slowly, painfully, imperfectly-to official nondiscrimination.1 8 Shortly thereafter, the Supreme
Court decided Brown and Bolling, rejecting the separate-but-equal view of
equal protection.
This timing was not merely coincidental. The federal courts are
shaped by the same national political constituency that constrains the action of the other federal branches, such that the courts and the other
branches will often share a basic normative stance on important national
issues.' 9 The heightened judicial commitment to racial nondiscrimina377 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1964) (invalidating statute denationalizing naturalized citizens
under circumstances where native-born citizens would not be denationalized).
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part ILA-B.
18. See infra notes 139-143, 151-153 and accompanying text.
19. See infra Part V (describing work of scholars taking various views on the influence
of national norms on the courts).
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tion in Brown and Boling was an outgrowth of a general rise in national
antidiscrimination norms in the 1940s and 1950s. 20 Those norms had
largely done their work in the national polity-though not in all of the
states-before Bolling was decided. In the effort to eliminate overt racism
in official federal policy, little work remained for reverse incorporation to
do. And since Bolling, given the political norms that prevent official policy from engaging in overt racism, and given the judicial construction of
equal protection to prohibit only discrimination that is overt, 21 official
policy never runs afoul of the constitutional rule.
Nor has reverse incorporation been a consequential force in redressing federal discrimination that persisted in spite of official policy.
To the extent that legal rules have successfully checked such unauthorized discrimination, the relevant rules have been nonconstitutional:
The same mainstream federal norm that repudiated official discrimination also created a web of statutory and administrative rules to enforce
antidiscrimination norms within the government. 2 2 That web is dense,
leaving few gaps for equal protection to fill and indeed often preempting
the possibility of constitutional remedies for litigants who complain of
discrimination. 23 In principle, if that web did not exist, reverse incorporation might do consequential work. But without the norm that generated the statutory and administrative web, the courts would not have created reverse incorporation. In short, the same forces that created reverse
incorporation have also ensured that reverse incorporation does little of
practical consequence-at least where discrimination against racial minority groups is concerned.
In other areas, however, reverse incorporation has been more consequential, and the analysis outlined above helps explain why. The mainstream of the national polity clearly opposes overt racial discrimination
against racial minority groups, and that norm animates Congress and the
executive as well as the courts. On affirmative action, however, the national polity is divided, and so are the courts. 24 There is no normative
consensus for the different branches to share, with the consequence that
the courts occasionally second-guess the policies that Congress and the
20. See Dudziak, supra note 10, at 79-114 (discussing Truman Administration action
such as integration of Armed Forces taken in context of American racism being used for
Soviet propaganda purpose); Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights, supra note 11, at
171-289 (describing shifting attitudes toward race after World War II, as well as
corresponding shift in Supreme Court decisions); Richard A. Primus, The American
Language of Rights 177-233 (1999) [hereinafter Primus, Language of Rights] (discussing
American concepts of rights and justice as developing in response to Nazi and Soviet
totalitarianism).
21. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (limiting judicially
cognizable equal protection violations to instances of intentional discrimination).
22. See infra Part V.B.
23. See, e.g., Brown v. Gen. Serv. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 835 (1976) (holding that
statutory remedies for employment discrimination by the federal government preclude
other judicial relief).
24. See infra notes 252-253 and accompanying text.
HeinOnline -- 104 Colum. L. Rev. 980 2004
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executive endorse. A similar dynamic helps explain why courts have
found unconstitutional federal discrimination on nonracial grounds.
There is no clear national norm regarding the appropriate distinctions
that can be made between, for example, citizens and aliens, or legitimate
and illegitimate children. Moreover, the system of statutory and administrative antidiscrimination rules is not as comprehensive where nonracial
discrimination is concerned, 25 so federal conduct that would be addressed through nonconstitutional means if it were based on race is more
often in need of a constitutional remedy when it is based on other
26
grounds.
This Article is thus concerned with a descriptive account of reverse
incorporation. It is, to be sure, a descriptive account that raises questions
about a leading normative defense for that doctrine. But it is not my
ambition to argue that reverse incorporation is invalid or that Bolling was
wrongly decided. On the contrary, my own view is that both Boling and
reverse incorporation are normatively defensible, albeit not for reasons of
practical necessity. 27 Instead, they are appropriate expressions of a fundamental shift in constitutional thought in the years around World War
II, a shift that featured a heightened commitment to universal individualism and racial antidiscrimination. I suspect that the traditional argument
that Boling is justified by force of practical necessity springs in part from
constitutional lawyers' reluctance to acknowledge the broad role of that
shift as an independent source of legitimacy in constitutional law. 28 But
25. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000) (prohibiting the use of federal funds for
programs that discriminate on the basis of race, but not addressing discrimination on the
basis of sex); § 2000e-16(a) (prohibiting discrimination in federal employment on the
basis of race and sex, but not addressing discrimination on the basis of alienage or family
status).
26. The important limiting case is that of sex discrimination, which is addressed in
many (but not all) of the statutes and regulations forbidding discrimination and yet has
been the source of a few judicial decisions against the federal government. Those cases,
however, were almost entirely decided during the 1970s, a decade during which the
national norm on sex discrimination was hotly contested. Since the consolidation of a
norm against overt sex discrimination, very few sex discrimination cases have been decided
against the federal government. See infra Part V.C.
27. Even if Bolling and reverse incorporation turn out not to have been necessary for
the ends they were imagined to be essential for, proponents of the various necessity
arguments could fall back upon the claim that judges in the generation of Boling did not
have the benefit of our hindsight and might have believed in good faith that reverse
incorporation was more necessary than it now appears to have been. Whether such a claim
sufficiently justifies Boling or reverse incorporation depends on whether one measures the
legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking against what the deciding judges believed, in good
faith and given their position in history, or against what the world is actually like.
28. Similarly, the best attempts to derive reverse incorporation from earlier
constitutional authorities try to locate the source of the doctrine in Reconstruction, a time
whose generation of authoritative constitutional norms is uncontroversial. See Amar,
supra note 7, at 772-73 (suggesting that for the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment,
equal protection was a "clarifying gloss on the due process idea"); Lessig, supra note 7, at
410 (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment removed racial inequality from the list of
legitimate governmental ends). But just as others have wanted to read constitutional
history in ways that repress the fundamental changes of Reconstruction, see Norman W.
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in the end, the legitimacy of that shift and the legitimacy of reverse incorporation must stand and fall on the same normative judgment.
Part I of this Article charts the rise of a constitutional equality rule
binding the federal government. Part II presents the results of a review
of more than 1,300 cases raising equal protection claims under Boiling, in
order to document the absence of reported cases finding unconstitutional racial discrimination by the federal government. Part III considers
and mostly rejects three possible explanations for that absence of cases:
that the small number of cases is a function of the federal government's
limited jurisdiction, that the federal political process avoids discriminatory policies due to the pro-minority dynamics of a Madisonian "extended
republic, ' 29 and that the federal government abandoned its discriminatory practice because the Supreme Court articulated the reverse incorporation rule. Part IV shifts the focus from the conduct of the political
branches to the conduct of the judiciary by examining the role ofjudicial
deference. Part V then looks at the courts and the other branches in
tandem and develops the explanation that I most endorse, which is based
on shared federal norms. The norm against overt racial discrimination, I
argue, was already broadly held in the political branches by the time the
Court required it in Bolling. Congress and the executive had by that time
done most of the work that reverse incorporation demanded, leaving little for the constitutional rule to do. Rather than being a significant cause
of changed governmental behavior, reverse incorporation-at least in the
context of discrimination against racial minority groups-has been
mostly an artifact of change already accomplished.
I. THE RISE OF REVERSE INCORPORATION

A. Before Bolling
Prior to 1954, constitutional doctrine held that the Equal Protection
Clause was applicable only against the states and not against the federal
government. Litigants claiming discrimination by the federal government had periodically argued that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause contained an equal protection component of its own, but these
30
arguments were repeatedly rejected.
Spaulding, Constitution as Countermonument: Federalism, Reconstruction, and the
Problem of Collective Memory, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 2005-24 (2003) (arguing that the
Court's recent revival of federalism is a result of "memory work" that forgets the
significance of the Reconstruction Amendments), these defenses of reverse incorporation
obscure the fundamental constitutional shifts that occurred in the middle of the twentieth
century.
29. See The Federalist No. 51, at 335 (James Madison) (Robert Scigliano ed., 2000).
30. See, e.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (declaring that the
"Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause" in context of upholding military
curfew for persons ofJapanese descent); Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 337
(1943) (upholding statute giving tax advantage to certain property owners, because
"[u]nlike the Fourteenth Amendment the Fifth contains no equal protection clause and it
provides no guaranty against discriminatory legislation by Congress"); United States v.
HeinOnline -- 104 Colum. L. Rev. 982 2004
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Even if constitutional equal protection did not bind the federal government, however, the federal government did face certain requirements
of evenhandedness. Every legal system that respects the principle that
like cases should be treated alike necessarily answers to some idea of
equality, however thin,3 1 and the Court accordingly acknowledged that
some minimal spirit of "equality of application of the law" was inherent in
32
the system and specifically in the Due Process Clause.
That minimal spirit, however, did almost none of the work that the
Equal Protection Clause would later do. After all, whatever minimal
equality was inherent in the system had also been applicable against the
states before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, and for the
same reason. Accordingly, if the Equal Protection Clause merely required that likes be treated alike, it would have been entirely unnecessary. Instead, the Court explained, adoption of that Clause bound the
states to a form of equality far beyond the irreducible minimum inherent
in the notion of due process. 33 The federal government remained bound
only by that minimal spirit of equal application.
During the early twentieth century, complaints about unequal treatment by the federal government appeared mostly in challenges to the
new direct federal income tax, as litigants argued that the taxes fell on
them in discriminatory ways. 3 4 These contentions were routinely rejected
on the ground that the Fifth Amendment does not contain an equal proCarolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 151 (1938) (upholding constitutionality of a federal
statute that distinguished between filled milk and other dairy substitutes, because the

"Fifth Amendment has no equal protection clause"); La Belle Iron Works v. United States,
256 U.S. 377, 392 (1921) (rejecting claim that a federal tax was invalidly discriminatory on
the grounds that "[t]he Fifth Amendment has no equal protection clause").

But see

Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven, & Hartford R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 52 (1912) (assuming
arguendo that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause embodied a principle similar to
that of the Equal Protection Clause).
31. Similarly, this

minimal idea

of equality

routinely

becomes a

part of the

understanding of legal principles that seem in substance to be about values other than
equality. Consider, for example, the way that free speech doctrine incorporates an equality
component: Once there exists a legal claim against government restrictions on speech,
speech regulations come to be tested in part by whether they abridge some speakers' rights
more than the rights of other speakers who are similarly situated. See, e.g., Police Dep't v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96, 102 (1972) (striking down ordinance that permitted labor-related
picketing but not other picketing); see also Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central
Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 20, 21 (1975) (arguing that equality
"lies at the heart" of the protection of freedom of speech). But see Peter Westen, The
Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537, 542 (1982) (arguing that the principle that
like cases should be treated alike is not a coherent or legally helpful principle).
32. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332 (1921).
33. Id.
34. See Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103, 110 (1916) (rejecting argument
that income tax statute unconstitutionally denied mining companies and their
stockholders equal protection of the laws under the Fifth Amendment); Brushaber v.
Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 24-26 (1916) (rejecting claim that the federal income tax
operated discriminatoril\ in violation of the Fifth Amendment).
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tection clause.3 5 In the 1940s, however, when the military began limiting
the freedom of persons of Japanese descent living on the West Coast,
claims of federal discrimination began to appear in a more sensitive context. At first, the Court held to its old position: Hirabayashi v. United
States upheld a race-based curfew and reiterated without dissent that
"[t]he Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause." 36 But the
norm against racial discrimination was growing stronger during the war
years, in part because the conflict with an avowedly racist foreign enemy
made many Americans increasingly uncomfortable with racist practices at
home. 37 In 1944, Justice Frank Murphy's dissent in Korematsu v. United
States denounced the military order at issue in that case as a violation of
the Fifth Amendment, which he read to include a guarantee of equal
protection. 38 The majority, which upheld the military order, did not
adopt this doctrinal innovation. Nonetheless, it nodded to the growing
power of the norm against racial discrimination by declaring that measures limiting the rights of a particular racial group were "immediately
39
suspect."
The Korematsu Court did not explain what constitutional paradigm
gave rise to that suspicion. Instead, it ducked that technical issue by declining to identify equal protection, due process, or any other specific
constitutional guarantee as the basis for the petitioner's claim. Subsequent decisions also ducked the constitutional question, disposing of
cases without confirming or denying that the Fifth Amendment had an
equal protection component. 40 In Hurd v. Hodge, decided in 1948, the
Court articulated the federal nondiscrimination principle as one of "pub35. See Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 337 (1943) (estate taxes);
Helvering v. Lerner Stores Corp., 314 U.S. 463, 468 (1941) (excess profits tax); Steward
Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 584 (1937) (Social Security tax); La Belle Iron Works, 256
U.S. at 383, 392 (excess profits tax).
36. 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
37. See Primus, Language of Rights, supra note 20, at 186-91 (noting optimism of
many members of racial minority groups "that the American caste system would have to
give ground to the logical implications of one of America's leading explicit reasons for
fighting the war").
38. 323 U.S. 214, 234-35 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting) ("Being an obvious racial
discrimination, the order deprives all those within its scope of the equal protection of the
laws as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment."). Justice Murphy also pressed this position
in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 208-09 (1944) (Murphy, J.,
concurring), decided the same day as Korematsu. In his concurrence, Murphy argued that
a labor union exercising powers conferred by federal labor law could not discriminate by
race, because the Fifth Amendment forbade Congress to discriminate by race, and a union
acting under the provisions of federal labor law should be treated as an agent of Congress.
Id.
39. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
40. One good example is United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947). The respondent
in Petrillo was charged with violating the Communications Act of 1934, but he challenged
the Act by claiming that it discriminated against radio broadcasting employees in violation
of equal protection as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 3-5. Rather than
denying that the Fifth Amendment had an equal protection component, the Court
rejected respondent's equal protection claim on its merits. Id. at 8-9.
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lic policy" rather than as something grounded in the Constitution. 4 1
Hurd concerned a challenge to the enforcement of racially restrictive covenants in the District of Columbia. 4 2 Unlike Shelley v. Kraemer,43 Hurd's
companion case, Hurd could not be decided under the Equal Protection
Clause, because the government action in Hurd was that of the federal
government rather than that of a state. The petitioners in Hurd raised a
Fifth Amendment equal protection argument, and the Court ducked
again, deciding the case on statutory grounds instead. 4 4 But the Court
also offered an alternative rationale, one based on "the public policy of
the United States." 45 That public policy, the Court explained, did not
permit a federal court to use its equitable powers for a purpose that
would violate basic constitutional rights if undertaken by a state court.46
Thus, at the end of the 1940s, the federal government's obligation to
avoid racial discrimination was articulated at the level of statutes and public policy rather than as a matter of constitutional equal protection. As
such, this obligation could prevent a court from discriminating when sitting in equity, as in Hurd. It might also influence the interpretation of
statutes and regulations whose meanings were ambiguous with respect to
racial discrimination. 47 But no holding yet established a constitutional
rule that would override a legislative or administrative choice to
discriminate.
B. Bolling and Beyond
The segregation of the District of Columbia's public schools was
rooted in old statutory authority. 48 Overcoming that authority and ordering desegregation would require a holding on constitutional grounds,
and that is what Boling delivered. Without a great deal of doctrinal exposition-the text of the whole opinion occupies less than three pages in
the United States Reports-the Supreme Court concluded that "racial
segregation in the public schools of the District of Columbia is a denial of
the due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution." 49 Specifically, school segregation violated due process because it
41. 334 U.S. 24, 35 (1948).
42. Id. at 26-28.
43. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
44. See Hurd, 334 U.S. at 30, 33-34 (reading Civil Rights Act of 1866 to forbid a
federal court to enforce a racially restrictive covenant, thus making it "unnecessary to
resolve" the constitutional question).
45. Id. at 35.
46. Id. at 35-36.
47. See, e.g., Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 199-200 (1944)
(reading Railway Labor Act to impose an obligation of nondiscrimination on unions
exercising bargaining rights thereunder).
48. See Carr v. Coming, 182 F.2d 14, 18-19 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (reviewing the statutory
history of segregation in the District's schools, and rejecting a challenge to that
segregation).
49. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
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was "not reasonably related to any proper governmental objective" and
50
was therefore "an arbitrary deprivation of... liberty."
Construed strictly, that doctrinal rationale did not entail a new rule
whereby the constitutional apparatus of equal protection would apply
against the federal government. Formally, the choice to rest on due process rather than equal protection avoided any overt rejection of the
Court's previous holdings. Indeed, Boling recited once again that the
Fifth Amendment does not expressly contain an equal protection
clause. 51 Substantively, the Court need not have relied on equal protection at all, because due process already embodied the idea that government may not deprive people of liberty without a legitimate public purpose. Due process was understood to include a minimum standard of
rationality and evenhandedness, thus prohibiting truly arbitrary or irrational government action. 5 2 If school segregation was arbitrary and not
reasonably related to any proper governmental objective, it would fail
what we now know as rational basis scrutiny under the Due Process
Clause. Equal protection need play no part.
For those who are disposed to defend the constitutionality of affirmative action, the foregoing analysis points to a temptingly elegant doctrinal
position. If school segregation and other forms of status-reinforcing racial discrimination violated the due process guarantee because they
served no valid governmental purpose, then Boling could have ordered
desegregation under pure due process principles, and constitutional law
could have maintained the position that due process but not equal protection binds the federal government. This resolution would have allowed the federal government leeway to make racial distinctions forbidden to the states, so long as those distinctions could survive rational basis
scrutiny. 53 Many or most forms of race-based affirmative action fail strict
scrutiny, but they would surely survive a rational basis test. Standard rationales for affirmative action such as remedying the effects of past discrimination 54 or promoting diversity5 5 are legitimate governmental interests, and affirmative action clearly has some tendency to advance them,
even if reasonable legislators could disagree about the wisdom of choos50. Id.
51. Id. at 499. But see Akhil Reed Amar, Constitutional Rights in a Federal System:
Rethinking Incorporation and Reverse Incorporation, in Benchmarks:
Great
Constitutional Controversies in the Supreme Court 71, 79 (Terry Eastland ed., 1995)
(reading Bolling to consider it "largely irrelevant" that the text of the Fourteenth
Amendment addresses the Equal Protection Clause to the states rather than the federal
government).
52. See Howard Gillman, The Constitution Besieged 104-05 (1993).
53. It would also avoid the textual and historical problems with reading the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause to incorporate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause. See supra text accompanying note 7.
54. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 496-99 (1989)
(discussing scope of past discrimination that can be redressed by an affirmative action
program).
55. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2337 (2003) (holding that
promoting diversity within a student body can be a compelling interest).
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ing that means to promote those ends. Once exempted from the requirement of fitting means closely to ends, the federal government would be
largely free to practice affirmative action.
The elegance of that reading, however, is purchased only by focusing
on one cogent doctrinal statement in Boling and ignoring a fair amount
of contrary context. Consider, for example, the Court's statement in
Korematsu that all governmental measures curtailing the rights of particular racial groups are subject to "the most rigid scrutiny." 56 Whether Korematsu was a due process case or an equal protection case, or both or
neither, that statement makes it hard to argue that constitutional law as
of 1954 subjected federal discrimination only to the minimal, rationalbasis style requirements of due process. Similarly, the Court's 1938 decision in United States v. CaroleneProducts Co. suggested that discrimination
against minority groups would face heightened scrutiny under the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, not under the Fourteenth Amendment.5 7 The claim in CaroleneProducts was, after all, brought against the
federal government, and the Court dismissed any equal protection arguments on the simple basis that the Fifth Amendment contains no equal
protection clause.5 8 Thus, the pre-Bolling case law had already articulated
the position that in racial discrimination cases due process required more
59
than governmental rationality.
Rather than choosing clearly between the minimal due process approach and the more expansive heightened scrutiny approach, the Bolling Court gave voice to both. On one hand it described segregation as
arbitrary, but on the other hand it declared that the Constitution imposed no less a duty of antidiscrimination on the federal government
56. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
57. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting the need for more searching judicial
inquiry where the political process could not be trusted to protect "discrete and insular"
minorities).
58. Id. at 151.
59. A dogged lawyer might point out that these statements in Korematsu and Carotene
Products are technically both dicta, such that the question of what due process required of
the federal government in racial discrimination cases remained technically open. As a
doctrinal matter, that is a legitimate argument. But the issue of how due process would
apply in discrimination cases was ultimately a question of larger norms rather than precise
legalisms, and the Court's statements in Korematsu and Carolene Products indicate judicial
scruples about permitting the federal government to engage in racial discrimination on a
showing of rational basis. Similarly, neither Carolene Products nor Korematsu dealt with
racial classifications intended to benefit disadvantaged groups, but that is of little
moment-neither did Boling. The decision to apply the same scrutiny to all racial
classifications, articulated in Croson, is analytically independent of the decision to apply the
same equality norms against the states and the federal government. Once the principle
was established that racial classifications required strict scrutiny, a court holding the views
that animated Croson would surely reach the conclusion of Adarand on the basis of Carotene
Products and Korematsu even if the prevailing doctrinal view remained that Fifth
Amendment due process did not fully incorporate Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection.
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than on the states. 60 The second approach was to prevail. Lower courts
began citing Boling as authority for the more general proposition that
the federal government was constitutionally barred from practicing racial
discrimination, 61 and the Court's own decisions after Boling treated the
Fifth Amendment as if it fully incorporated equal protection.
To be sure, the Court did not immediately abandon the minimal due
process voice. Opinions in several subsequent cases repeated the claim
that although the Fifth Amendment prohibits discrimination that is so
unjustifiable as to violate due process, it contains no equal protection
clause. 62 In none of those cases, however, did the Court uphold a challenged practice on the ground that the discrimination it embodied,
though at odds with equal protection, was sufficiently justifiable to satisfy
due process. The cases-none of which involved racialdiscriminationeither struck down discriminatory practices as violating due process 63 or
to
upheld challenged practices on rationales that showed the practices
64
comport not only with due process but also with equal protection.
The absence of any cases in which the distinction between the antidiscrimination mandates of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments had
consequences may have made it harder to insist upon a real distinction.
(Or it may signal that there remained no real distinction upon which to
60. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) ("In view of our decision that the
Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it
would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the
Federal Government.").
61. See, e.g., Dyer v. Kazuhisa Abe, 138 F. Supp. 220, 226-27 (D. Haw. 1956) (holding
that an equal protection claim in a federal territory was cognizable because equal
protection and due process sufficiently overlapped under the authority of Boling), rev'd,
256 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1958); United States ex rel. Lee Kum Hoy v. Shaughnessy, 123 F.
Supp. 674, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (holding that it would violate due process to require that
persons of Chinese descent, but not other persons, undergo blood tests to establish
familial relationships in immigration proceedings).
62. See Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964); accord United States Dep't of
Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 n.5 (1973); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 680
n.5 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641-42 (1969).
63. See, e.g., Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 690-91 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (holding
that provision requiring female but not male members of armed forces to establish spousal
dependency in order to claim benefits violated due process under heightened scrutiny
analysis); Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 641-42 (welfare eligibility requirement that applicant have
resided in jurisdiction for at least one year violated Due Process Clause of Fifth
Amendment); Schneider, 377 U.S. at 168 (due process did not allow Congress to
discriminate against naturalized citizens by stripping them of nationality while residing
abroad); see also Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 116-17 (1976) (striking down
federal Civil Service Commission rule that required that members of the civil service be
citizens).
64. See, e.g., Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 421-22, 430 (1974) (upholding
sentencing rule that disfavored convicts with two prior felonies, because classification was
not suspect and thus required only a rational basis); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434,
446 (1973) (upholding federal statutory scheme that required even indigents to pay filing
fees for bankruptcy proceedings, stating it satisfied rational basis test applicable in equal
protection cases not involving fundamental rights or discrimination on the basis of suspect
classifications).
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insist, or both may be true in combination.) Over time, the Court became less careful about insisting on the difference, speaking sometimes
of "equal protection" as a rule binding the federal government without
bothering to recite that the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause. 65 By the mid-1970s, the Court asserted flatly and repeatedly
that the rules governing Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims were, and had always been, the same. 66 The historian of ideas
should squirm at this assertion; it certainly does not map constitutional
thought before 1935, and even Bolling did not establish this complete
version of reverse incorporation. 67 As a practical matter, though, the fact
that reverse incorporation was articulated haltingly in the first twenty
years after Bolling seems to have made little difference. From Bolling forward-and indeed, perhaps already a few years before Boiling, in cases
like CaroleneProducts and Korematsu-constitutional doctrine has behaved
as if the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause incorporated the full
apparatus of Fourteenth Amendment equal protection against the fed68
eral government.

65. See, e.g., Marshall, 414 U.S. at 422 (speaking of "the concept of equal protection
as embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment"); Kras, 409 U.S. at 446
("We are also of the opinion that the [federal] filing fee requirement does not deny Kras
the equal protection of the laws.").
66. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) ("Equal protection analysis in the Fifth
Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment."); Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) ("This Court's approach to Fifth Amendment
equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal protection claims
under the Fourteenth Amendment.").
67. In addition to the Court's repeated (if largely empty) assertions after Boling that
the Fifth Amendment does not contain an equal protection clause, one should remember
that the possibility that equal protection would apply differently to the federal and state
governments-though applicable in some form to each-remained alive until Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). Adarandrejected Metro Broadcasting, Inc.
v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), which had held that federal affirmative action was subject to
less strict equal protection scrutiny than affirmative action practiced by state governments.
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 225-27; see also id. at 215-18 (describing equal protection under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as having been coextensive ever since Boiling). In
addition to holding that the same level of scrutiny applies to federal and state affirmative
action, Adarand more broadly rejected the idea of different equal protection approaches
for the federal and state governments. Adarand recognized that the Court had previously
suggested that federal responsibility for national security and immigration might permit
the federal government to discriminate between citizens and aliens in ways that the states
may not. The usual citation for this proposition is Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S.
88 (1976), in which the Court struck down a federal Civil Service Commission rule
requiring that members of the civil service be citizens. At the same time, it qualified its
holding by stating that "there may be overriding national interests which justify selective
federal legislation that would be unacceptable for an individual State." Id. at 100.
According to Adarand, however, Mow Sun Wong's suggestion of a distinction does not
materially affect the general rule under which equal protection applies identically to the
federal and state governments. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 217-18.
68. The only contrary holding-Metro Broadcasting-was expressly overruled. See
supra note 67.
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THE ABSENCE OF CASES

Despite the extension of equal protection to cover the federal government, there are virtually no reported cases in which a court holds a
federal law or other federal action 69 unconstitutional on the grounds that
it discriminates against a racial minority group. There have been cases
finding that federal law discriminated unconstitutionally on nonracial
grounds, and there have been cases striking down federal affirmative action programs, but there have been almost no decisions holding that the
federal government violated equal protection by practicing racial discrimination against nonwhites. Many cases are'not litigated all the way to
judgment, and many judgments are not reported, so the absence of reported judgments does not mean that litigants never obtain relief on the
basis of constitutional race discrimination claims against the federal government. Nonetheless, the absence of reported judgments is striking.
A. FederalDiscrimination Against Racial Minority Groups
The purest kind of successor case to Bolling would be one in which
the Supreme Court sustained an equal protection challenge to a federal
statute or regulation on the grounds that that statute or regulation discriminated against African Americans. Other than Boling itself, no case
answers to that description. 70 Nor has the Court ever found a violation of
the equal protection rights of African Americans in federal action below
the level of a formal regulation, such as an agency order or even the
actions of an individual federal officer. 71 Broadening the category to in69. Throughout this Article, I use the term "federal law" to mean statutes passed by
Congress and codified regulations promulgated by federal agencies. I use phrases like
"other federal action" or "other federal conduct" to encompass the residual category of all
other activities taken with the force of federal authority, including the individual actions of
federal officers.
70. The findings described in this Part are based on research that I conducted or
directed between May and November of 2003. To find cases in which litigants successfully
stated reverse incorporation claims, I searched Westlaw's ALLFEDS and ALLSTATES
databases for all instances of the phrase "Boiling v. Sharpe." Those searches defined a
universe of more than 1,300 decisions. Then, three people separately examined each one
of those cases to determine whether the court found unconstitutional behavior on the part
of the federal government. Every case in which a court did find unconstitutional
discrimination was further coded as to (1) the basis of the plaintiff's discrimination claim
or claims (e.g., race, sex, age) and (2) the group suffering discrimination (e.g., blacks,
women, the elderly). Because a less than careful court might proceed with an equal
protection analysis against the federal government without citing the authority that
permits it to do so, this method may have missed a few cases, but it is unlikely to have
missed many. (Since I began writing this Article, I have asked dozens of law professors for
examples of cases holding that the federal government violated the equal protection rights
of racial minority groups. No one has identified any that qualify but were not discovered
through my search.) Most importantly, the basic observation and argument of this Article
would not be much affected even if this method had missed a few cases, so long as the total
number remained comparably small.
71. Perhaps the closest thing to such a case is Hills v. Gautreaux,which concerned the
appropriate remedy for discrimination against African Americans in public housing
around Chicago, Illinois. 425 U.S. 284, 286 (1976). The relevant discrimination had been

HeinOnline -- 104 Colum. L. Rev. 990 2004

2004]

BOLLING ALONE

clude racial discrimination against Latinos, Asians, Native Americans, or
any other racial minority group does not change the tally: There are no
Supreme Court cases holding federal action to be unconstitutional racial
discrimination against a member or members of any such group.
Nor is there any significant volume of equal protection enforcement
in lower court cases. Reported cases involving claims of unconstitutional
discrimination are common, 72 but the litigants raising those claims are
overwhelmingly unsuccessful. Not counting cases in which lower courts
73
upheld equal protection challenges but were reversed by higher courts,
I have been able to identify only twelve reported cases since 1954 in
which any state or lower federal court has awarded relief to a black litigant or litigants on the grounds that the federal government engaged in
unconstitutional racial discrimination.7 4 Only one of these cases-Simestablished in the lower courts, see Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 739-40 (7th Cir.
1971), and was not at issue before the Supreme Court. Accordingly, I have counted
Gautreaux v. Romney among the cases of unconstitutional discrimination found by lower
courts, see infra note 74, rather than counting Hills as a case in which the Supreme Court
found such unconstitutional discrimination.
72. There are more than 1,300 reported cases disposing of such claims. See supra
note 70.
73. See, e.g., City of New York v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 34 F.3d 1114,
1131 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that census bureau violated equal protection by refusing to
adjust population figures to rectify the undercounting of minority groups), rev'd sub nom.
Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517 U.S. 1, 115-17 (1996) (granting wide discretion to
Congress in conducting census and rejecting heightened standard of review distilled from
equal protection principles); Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(holding that employment test with disparate racial impact violates equal protection),
rev'd, 426 U.S. 229, 238-39 (1976) (holding that disparate impact does not violate equal
protection in the absence of discriminatory intent).
74. The cases are United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1992) (reversing a
criminal conviction after concluding that federal prosecutor had exercised a race-based
peremptory challenge during jury selection); NLRB v. Mansion House Ctr. Mgmt. Corp.,
473 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1973) (refusing to enforce an NLRB order that required an
employer to recognize and collectively bargain with a racially discriminatory union);
Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971) (holding that Chicago Housing
Authority had operated public housing programs in a discriminatory way against blacks
and that Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was complicit because it
provided funds), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976);
Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963) (striking down
provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 291e(f) and 42 C.F.R. § 53.112 that permitted use of federal
funds in building "separate but equal" hospitals); Pedersen v. Burton, 400 F. Supp. 960
(D.D.C. 1975) (barring use of marriage license applications requiring applicants to state
their "color"); United States v. City of Chicago, 395 F. Supp. 329 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (enjoining
disbursement of federal funds to local government program found to be discriminatory);
Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (holding federal housing officials
partly responsible for pattern of racial segregation that contributed to ongoing de facto
school segregation); Kelley v. Metro. County Bd. of Educ., 372 F. Supp. 540 (M.D. Tenn.
1973) (finding that federal officials unconstitutionally impeded desegregation mandate of
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), by denying funding to local authorities
for purpose of transporting schoolchildren); NAACP v. Brennan, 360 F. Supp. 1006
(D.D.C. 1973) (finding federal liability for discrimination by state-operated employment
services funded by Department of Labor); Henderson v. Agric. Stabilization &
Conservation Serv., 317 F. Supp. 430 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (invalidating results of elections for
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kins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital-actually invalidated a congressional statute or a codified federal regulation.
Moreover, reverse incorporation was a necessary condition for relief
in only three of the twelve cases. In eight of the twelve, federal liability
was parasitic on someone else's illegal discriminatory behavior, usually
that of state officials. 75 In those cases, federal agencies were found to
have supported, usually financially, state or local government actions that
were unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the
underlying state or local conduct was unconstitutional irrespective of federal participation, it could have been invalidated without a judgment
against a federal party. The practical result-no public funding for segregated hospitals, schools, or housing-would have been the same with or
without reverse incorporation.7 6 One of the remaining four cases reversed a federal criminal conviction after finding that the prosecutor ex77
ercised a race-based peremptory strike in violation of Batson v. Kentucky,
but the Batson violation was not necessary for the reversal, because the
court separately held that there was insufficient evidence to support the
conviction. 78 Thus, only in three cases was reverse incorporation necesthe Macon County, Alabama committee of the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation
Service based on vote dilution); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967)
(ordering District of Columbia officials to stop dragging their feet in the desegregation
that Bolling had required years before). In addition, one should count Hicks v. Weaver,
302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969), which held that HUD was a passive participant in a
discriminatory housing scheme orchestrated by the local government. The court in Hicks
did not actually enter judgment on Fifth Amendment grounds, contenting itself with
finding federal liability under HUD's own interpretation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, which prohibits racial discrimination in any program receiving federal funds. 42
U.S.C. § 2000d (2000). But the plaintiffs in the case did include a constitutional claim,
and the opinion in its entirety can be read to find a constitutional violation as well as a
statutory one. Choosing to construe ambiguous data against my thesis, I therefore include
Hicks among cases finding constitutional violations even though the district court did not
find one in so many words.
75. Federal liability was parasitic on state and local discrimination in Gautreaux, 448
F.2d at 739; Simkins, 323 F.2d at 962-63; Chicago, 395 F. Supp. at 332-33; Hart, 383 F. Supp.
at 706-07; Kelley, 372 F. Supp at 543; Brennan, 360 F. Supp. at 1008-09; and Hicks, 302 F.
Supp. at 622. In NLRB v. Mansion House, the underlying discrimination was that of a labor
union. 473 F.2d at 472-73. Because the union was not a state actor, it avoided liability
under the Fourteenth Amendment, but its discrimination was forbidden by Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (providing that labor organizations
may not discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
76. By way of illustration, consider Simkins in greater detail. The legally contentious
issue in that case was whether the hospital construction was state action, not whether the
segregation of hospitals violated equal protection. Once the court concluded that there
was sufficient public involvement to render the funding state action, the flow of funds was
forbidden under both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the former under Bolling
and the latter under the Equal Protection Clause itself, because the program at issue called
for the federal funds to be routed through the states. Simkins, 323 F.2d at 969-70. As long
as the Fourteenth Amendment prohibition applied, the funding at issue would not have
been permissible.
77. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
78. See United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 828-31 (9th Cir. 1992).
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sary to redress the underlying discrimination. Two were local matters in
Washington, D.C.-one revisited Boling itself by ordering concrete steps
toward school desegregation, 79 and the other forbade the use of marriage
license applications that asked applicants to specify their "color. 8 0° The
one remaining case invalidated the results of an election for a local committee of the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service in Macon County, Alabama. 8 ' This is not a large yield for fifty years worth of
82
litigation.
The record of successful claims in reported cases probably understates the practical impact of a doctrine. Even when courts do not grant
legal relief, the threat of such relief can cause parties to settle their disputes8 3 or alter their underlying behavior before disputes arise in the first
place.8 4 The full impact of reverse incorporation as a check on federal
discrimination against nonwhites is therefore likely to be greater than reflected in the cases cited above. 85 But unless the absence of cases en79. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 514-19 (D.D.C. 1967).
80. Pedersen v. Burton, 400 F. Supp. 960, 963 (D.D.C. 1975).
81. Henderson v. Agric. Stabilization & Conservation Serv., 317 F. Supp. 430, 434, 438
(M.D. Ala. 1970). The ASCS was created by Congress to administer certain federal
agricultural programs. Although it is therefore a federal body, much of its work is done by
locally elected county committees. In Henderson, local whites conspired to nominate a
large number of black candidates for Macon County's committee offices, thus splitting the
black vote several different ways and securing the election of white candidates. Id. at
433-34.
82. In addition to these cases granting relief to African Americans, there are three
cases granting relief to Native Americans on race discrimination claims and one granting
relief to a Latino, but none involving any other racial minority group. All three of the
cases involving Native Americans raised the same issue: Under the Major Crimes Act, ch.
645, 62 Stat. 758 (1948) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000)), Indians who
committed certain crimes on reservation land were subject to the local state penalties for
those crimes while non-Indians committing the same crimes were subject to the general
federal schedule of punishments. See United States v. Big Crow, 523 F.2d 955, 960 (8th
Cir. 1975) (finding the disparity unconstitutionally discriminatory); United States v.
Cleveland, 503 F.2d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 1974) (same); United States v. Boone, 347 F.
Supp. 1031, 1035 (D.N.M. 1972) (same). The one case in which a Latino litigant
successfully demonstrated an equal protection violation is somewhat ironic, because the
unconstitutional discriminators in that case were mostly African American. See Acosta v.
Univ. of D.C., 528 F. Supp. 1215, 1222-23 (D.D.C. 1981) (finding that a university
committee primarily comprised of African Americans discriminatorily denied promotion
to a Latino assistant professor). It should also be noted that equal protection did no
independent work in Acosta: The court's analysis was conducted under Tide VII's statutory
standard for discrimination. See id. at 1221-22.
83. See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950, 956 (1979).
84. See infra notes 133-134 and accompanying text (discussing the power of legal
deterrents and incentives to influence behavior).
85. Here are two examples, both from the realm of prison litigation. In May of 1965,
the warden of a federal prison in the state of Washington issued a policy directive stating
that inmate housing and work assignments would be made without respect to race. The
warden was at the time the defendant in a racial discrimination suit brought by an inmate
who alleged that race was being considered in such assignments. The district court
granted summary judgment for the warden, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal
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joining such discrimination reflects the government's having reacted to
Bolling by reforming itself comprehensively before further judgments
were necessary-a possibility considered in Part III.C-the preceding review of cases calls into question the idea that reverse incorporation has
been necessary for addressing federal discrimination against members of
disadvantaged racial groups.
B. Comparisons
In addition to being small in absolute terms, the number of cases in
which reverse incorporation has been necessary for curing federal racial
discrimination is small in comparison to the number of cases finding
other kinds of constitutional violations by the federal government. These
include affirmative action cases, cases involving nonracial discrimination,
and cases outside of the equal protection arena entirely. Unsurprisingly,
the number of cases finding unconstitutional racial discrimination by the
federal government is also small in comparison to the number of cases
finding unconstitutional racial discrimination by many states.
1. Affirmative Action. - There are more reported cases in which reverse incorporation has been used to strike down affirmative action for
African Americans than reported cases in which reverse incorporation
86
has been necessary to cure discrimination against African Americans.
This comparison holds over the entire fifty-year period since Boling, but
87
it is especially stark in the years since Adarand Constructors,Inc. v. Pena.
In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., the Supreme Court held that all state
government actions using express racial classifications are subject to strict
on the grounds that the policy statement made the case moot. But the Ninth Circuit's
opinion also hinted that it was the lawsuit that had provoked the warden to issue the policy
statement. See Toles v. Katzenbach, 385 F.2d 107, 108 (9th Cir. 1967) ("Appellant has
already accomplished something of what he seeks."). A similar result had occurred one
year earlier when the Fourth Circuit heard a challenge to the segregation of barbershops
at Lorton Reformatory, which was the major prison facility for Washington, D.C. (though
physically located in Virginia, within the Fourth Circuit's jurisdiction). Noting that the
prison was already in the process of constructing a new, integrated barbershop, the court
entered only an order requiring desegregation as of the future date when the new
barbershop would be completed. See Bolden v. Pegelow, 329 F.2d 95, 96 (4th Cir. 1964).
86. See, e.g., MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Ass'n v. FCC, 236 F.3d 13, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(striking down FCC rule that in some cases required broadcasters to report race and sex of
each job applicant and thus "pressured licensees to recruit minorities"); Lutheran ChurchMo. Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 356 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding diversity of programming
did not justify race-based classification in FCC hiring rule); United States v. Ovalle, 136
F.3d 1092, 1106-07 (6th Cir. 1998) (invalidating attempt to increase the proportion of
blacks in federal jury pool); Hammon v. Berry, 813 F.2d 412, 431-32 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(striking down affirmative action plan for hiring firefighters, because purpose of program
was to "achieve racial balance"); In re Sherbrooke Sodding Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1037
(D. Minn. 1998) (holding that program pinning federal highway funds to contractors'
"disadvantaged business enterprise" status, defined to include only racial minorities, failed
strict scrutiny).
87. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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scrutiny, even if they are intended to improve the position of historically
disadvantaged groups.8 8 Adarand extended that rule to federal affirmative action, 89 and it did so largely on the authority of Bolling.' 0 Since
Adarand, courts have struck down federal affirmative action in several
cases, 9 1 but there has not been a single reported case finding unconstitutional federal racial discrimination against members of a minority
group. 92 Accordingly, one noteworthy feature of reverse incorporation is
that a doctrine originally bound up with the effort to dismantle Jim Crow
now operates to the net disadvantage of African Americans.
It is worth pausing for a moment to consider whether this fact offers
a cautionary tale about the unintended consequences ofjudicial decisionmaking. From a certain normative perspective, Adarand might be comeuppance for Warren Court activism. After all, one might imagine that
Adarand would have come out differently if the Court had not ordered
desegregation in Bolling, or if the holding of Bolling had been properly
cabined within a due process framework rather than acting as a fount for
the full incorporation of equal protection against the federal government. As discussed in Part I, however, this line of reasoning is open to
question. 93 Even without Bolling, CaroleneProducts and Korematsu would
support the idea that racially discriminatory legislation raises serious due
process problems, and the question of whether affirmative action requires the same level of judicial scrutiny as discrimination against disadvantaged groups is doctrinally independent of the question of whether
equal protection applies against the federal government. Thus, even if
equal protection were not deemed to apply the same way against the
states and the federal government, the Court that decided Croson could
94
have decided Adarand as a straight due process matter.
At a larger level, the real question is not about Bolling but about the
doctrinal choice to apply strict scrutiny to racially classificatory federal
action, regardless of whether the framework for that application is called
"due process" or "equal protection." To be more specific, the question is
whether the fact that reverse incorporation may have curtailed affirmative
action more than discrimination against disadvantaged groups erodes the
traditional claim that reverse incorporation is a manifestly necessary constitutional principle. The answer may depend on one's normative perspective. For someone who sees affirmative action as illegitimate racial
88. 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989).
89. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 228-29.
90. See id. at 215-17.
91. See cases listed supra note 86.
92. The only such case in the last quarter-century is United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d
820 (9th Cir. 1992). See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 56-59.
94. See supra note 59 (suggesting that regardless of formal incorporation of
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection into Fifth Amendment due process, a court
holding the views that animated Croson could reach the conclusion of Adarand on the basis
of Carolene Products and Korematsu).
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discrimination on par with school segregation, the answer is probably no.
On this view, Adarand is a vindication of the principles that made Boling
necessary in the first place. In contrast, someone who favors affirmative
action might regard reverse incorporation's practical consequences as
making the doctrine not just unnecessary but positively undesirable.
More moderately, people who are neither strongly in favor of nor
strongly opposed to affirmative action, but who see it as raising different
issues from discrimination against disadvantaged groups, might see this
part of the empirical record as not greatly affecting the question of
whether reverse incorporation is a necessary doctrine. Dismantling Jim
Crow might require constitutional innovations, this perspective might
hold, but affirmative action is a sufficiently close and complex issue that it
should not be the root of arguments about extraordinary necessity, one
way or the other.
2. Nonracial Discrimination. - In addition to the affirmative action
cases, there are cases striking down federal action as unconstitutionally
discriminatory based on sex, 95 citizenship, 96 indigency, 9 7 and legiti-

95. See, e.g., Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979) (provision of benefits to families
with children with unemployed fathers but not to those with unemployed mothers);
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (Social Security benefits payable to widows
but not widowers on the basis of their deceased spouses' earnings); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (requirement that female but not male members of
armed forces establish spousal dependency in order to claim benefits); United States v. De
Gross, 913 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1990) (federal prosecutor's peremptory challenge to
venireperson based on her gender); In re Crist, 632 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1980) (bankruptcy
code provision making debts for alimony and support nondischargeable only when owed
by husbands to wives); Carrasco v. Sec'y of Health, Educ., & Welfare, 628 F.2d 624 (1st Cir.
1980) (allocation of Social Security disability benefits favoring husbands over wives in
community property jurisdictions, where income from trade or business treated as
husband's); Crawford v. Cushman, 531 F.2d 1114 (2d Cir. 1976) (Marine Corps regulation
mandating discharge of female Marines for pregnancy); Moritz v. Comm'r, 469 F.2d 466
(10th Cir. 1972) (disallowance of tax deduction to men never married).
96. See, e.g., Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426
U.S. 572 (1976) (Puerto Rico statutory restriction of civil engineering licenses to U.S.
citizens); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (regulation excluding
noncitizens, including lawfully admitted resident aliens, from employment in the federal
competitive civil service); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964) (act stripping nationality
from naturalized citizens for residing continuously in territory of their birth or former
nationality); see also Yeung v. INS, 76 F.3d 337 (11 th Cir. 1995) (discretionary relief from
deportation for criminal conviction available only to those aliens who have left the country
and returned); Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976) (same).
97. See, e.g., Wiren v. Eide, 542 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1976) (statute requiring $250 bond
to obtain hearing, when property at stake was less than $2,500); Paroutian v. United States,
471 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1972) (failure to count time spent in criminal sentence because
defendant unable to pay bail during appeal); Earnest v. Willingham, 406 F.2d 681 (10th
Cir. 1969) (agency's failure to provide counsel to indigent parolees in hearings to revoke
early release from federal penitentiaries); Doyle v. United States, 366 F.2d 394 (9th Cir.
1966) (failure to appoint adequate counsel in appeal of federal criminal conviction).
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macy, 98 as well as on other grounds. 99 The number of such nonracial
cases far exceeds the number of cases finding unconstitutional federal
racial discrimination against African Americans or members of other minority groups. 100 The litigated impact of Boiling thus appears to be
greater in nonracial areas than in the racial context that seemed to give
reverse incorporation its initial urgency. 1° 1
3. Other Constitutional Violations. - One might add a further comparative note by looking outside the discrimination context altogether. The
number of reported cases finding unconstitutional federal discrimination
against racial minorities is far smaller than the number of reported cases
finding federal violations of other kinds of constitutional rights, such as
free speech rights under the First Amendment or search-and-seizure
rights under the Fourth. The Supreme Court alone has struck down federal statutory and regulatory provisions on free speech grounds at least
nine times since 1995.102 Similarly, there were more appellate cases finding federal Fourth Amendment violations in the years 2002-2003 than
98. See, e.g., Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (Social Security benefits for
illegitimate children of "disabled wage-earner parent" contingent on parent's having
contributed to child's support or having lived with child prior to disability); Tanner v.
Weinberger, 525 F.2d 51 (6th Cir. 1975) (requirement that illegitimate child of deceased
wage-earner establish paternity and other association with wage-earner in order to receive
survivor's benefits); Eskra v. Morton, 524 F.2d 9 (7th Cir. 1975) (agency determination that
part of decedent's estate would go to legitimate child of decedent's niece but that nothing
would go to her illegitimate child); Beaty v. Weinberger, 478 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1973)
(requirement that illegitimate children be dependent upon disabled parent at time
disability begins in order to receive Social Security benefits).
99. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (family
status); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (place of residence); Miller v. United
States, 388 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1967) (conscientious objector status).
100. The same method used to find race discrimination cases, described supra note
70, discovered approximately eighty such reported decisions in the federal courts, not
counting decisions reversed by higher courts.
101. I use the phrase "litigated impact" rather than simply the word "impact" because
I have not yet demonstrated that Bolling has not had significant internalizationeffects on the
federal government's policies with respect to race. If the existence of the rule prevented
the government from engaging in racial discrimination that it would otherwise practice,
then reverse incorporation would have a large impact in racial areas. Part III.C analyzes
the possibility that Boiling has had such effects, whether through simple deterrence or as
part of a process of changing the norms that guide federal action.
102. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 377 (2002) (striking down
statute restricting drug advertising); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 258
(2002) (Child Pornography Prevention Act); United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S.
405, 413 (2001) (rule requiring mushroom growers to contribute to industry advertising);
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 547 (2001) (rule prohibiting lawyers funded
by public Legal Services Corporation from challenging existing welfare law); United States
v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 827 (2000) (section 505 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 883 (1997) (two
provisions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §§ 223(a) (1) (B) (ii),
223(d)); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 766
(1996) (section l0b of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 483 (1995) (27 U.S.C. § 205(e) (2), a
provision of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act prohibiting beer labels from
HeinOnline -- 104 Colum. L. Rev. 997 2004

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 104:975

appellate cases finding unconstitutional federal discrimination against
members of racial minority groups in the entire fifty-year period since
1 03
Boling.
Clearly, these comparisons cannot boast scientific controls. First and
Fourth Amendment litigation differ from equal protection litigation in
many ways that could make them more likely to generate new case law
finding constitutional violations, such that the present comparison can
only be impressionistic. To the extent that the comparison is informative, however, it indicates that the number of cases finding unconstitutional federal discrimination against racial minorities is notjust small but
unusually small.
4. Racial Discriminationby States. - Finally, it is useful to compare the
experience of states and that of the federal government. A small number
of decisions finding that states violated the equal protection rights of racial minority groups would suggest that there is nothing distinctive about
the absence of cases against the federal government. Instead, the phenomenon to be explained would be the general absence of cases finding
race-based equal protection violations. As it happens, however-and unsurprisingly so-there have been many more reported cases since 1954 in
which state (or local) governments are held to discriminate unconstitutionally against members of racial minority groups than there have been
parallel cases for the federal government.
One could reasonably wonder whether the quantitative difference
between cases finding state and federal violations might be a function of
the fact that the federal and state governments engage in different
(though overlapping) activities. Perhaps that difference, together with
the difference in the scale of governance undertaken by each kind of
government, affords state governments more opportunities to discriminate. If so, the larger number of cases finding state discrimination need
not indicate a greater judicial tendency to hold state conduct unconstitutionally discriminatory. 10 4 In Part III, I will argue that the activities allodisplaying alcohol content); United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S.
454, 477 (1995) (section 501(b) of the Ethics in Government Act).
103. See, e.g., United States v. Bridges, 344 F.3d 1010, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding
search warrant issued to IRS unconstitutional as overly broad and failing to specify criminal
activity being investigated); Wiley v. Dep't of Justice, 328 F.3d 1346, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(anonymous tip insufficient under Fourth Amendment to support federal agency's search
of employee's car); United States v. Portillo-Aguirre, 311 F.3d 647, 650 (5th Cir. 2002)
(Border Patrol's extended detention of defendant at immigration checkpoint became an
unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Keszthelyi,
308 F.3d 557, 568 (6th Cir. 2002) (DEA search violated Fourth Amendment); United States
v. Jones, 286 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2002) (FBI search violated Fourth Amendment).
104. Some readers may wonder why I have not solved this problem by looking at the
number of equal protection cases lost as a fraction of the total number of equal protection
claims that are brought against each kind of government. If one used the number of
adverse judgments as the numerator and the total litigated claims as the denominator, one
could compare the federal government's likelihood of avoiding an adverse judgment
under Bolling and a state's likelihood of avoiding an adverse judgment under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Such an approach, however, would be both unworkable and
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cated to the federal government are not inherently less likely to be sites
of racial discrimination than the activities allocated to the states. But the
problem of scale remains. Even if the federal and state governments engage in precisely the same kinds of activities, one should expect more
cases finding unconstitutional state discrimination if the states' activities
are more extensive. It is tempting to try to address this problem by quantifying the difference in size between the federal and state governments
and then discounting the number of state violations by the appropriate
percentage to control for the size difference, thereby arriving at a meaningful comparison between cases finding federal and state violations of
equal protection. Unfortunately, it is not possible to undertake such a
general control in a way that would be methodologically sound. In part
because state and federal governments engage in different mixes of activities, there is no single factor or even set of factors that can be used to
compute a meaningful comparison of their relative overall sizes.10 5 Ininaccurate. First, no data are readily available on the total number of equal protection
claims filed against either the federal government or any given state government. The
survey of cases presented in this Article reflects reported cases only. A comprehensive study
of reported cases is likely to identify the whole set, or almost the whole set, of cases actually
entering judgments of unconstitutionality-such cases are litigated all the way to
judgment, and they are also relatively unusual, thus making them worthy of publication.
Cases that are filed and quickly dismissed are much more likely to go unreported.
Accordingly, although a survey of reported cases can produce a respectable assessment of
the raw number of constitutional judgments against the government, it provides no
reliable guide to the total number of claims. Using the number of reported claims as the
denominator would be little more than arbitrary.
Second, even if it were feasible to establish a denominator that would allow us to
calculate different governments' relative likelihoods to win or lose equal protection cases,
the resulting rates of success in litigated cases would say little about the degree to which
judicially enforced equal protection checked or otherwise shaped the behavior of the
relevant governments. Imagine, for example, that during a given time period Defendant X
was sued on claims of unconstitutional racial discrimination ten times, losing six
judgments, while Defendant Y was sued a hundred times, losing thirty judgments.
Defendant X loses such cases at twice the rate of Defendant Y, but one cannot infer that
judicially enforced equal protection is more consequential for Defendant X than for
Defendant Y. Defendant Y has equal protection enforced against it more frequently, and
the fact that it also wins equal protection cases more often than Defendant X may simply
mean that plaintiffs are more inclined to bring suit against Defendant Y than against
Defendant X. Indeed, the larger number of judicially announced equal protection
violations by Defendant Y might encourage the filing of more equal protection lawsuits
against it, meritorious and nonmeritorious, than against Defendant X. For this reason as
well as the near impossibility of counting the total number of unreported lawsuits, it does
not make sense to use the percentage of successful equal protection claims as the basis for
statistical comparisons between different governments.
105. One could not, for example, get a meaningful sense of the relative "sizes" of the
federal government and a given state government by comparing the number of schools
they operated, because schooling is overwhelmingly the province of states. One might
compare budgets or the number of governmental employees, but neither of these
measures is likely to yield a ratio that is properly correlated to the ratio of opportunities for
violating equal protection: If the federal government spends ten million dollars to buy a
fighter plane and employs ten people to operate and maintain it, while a state government
spends forty thousand dollars to employ one police officer, there is little reason to think
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deed, and for the same reason, there is no precise sense in which it is
meaningful to speak of the state governments being collectively "larger"
than the federal government in the first place. Accordingly, the lessons
of quantitative comparisons between cases finding state and federal discrimination can be no more than suggestive.
For what they are worth, however, these comparisons suggest that the
constitutional prohibition on racial discrimination has had a greater impact on state governments-or at least on some state governments-than
on the federal government. To be sure, this is not true for all states, and
it is predictably more true for certain Southern states than for most states
elsewhere in the country. For instance, in the first decade after Brown
and Boling, judicial decisions finding violations of the equal protection
rights of African Americans by state government officials in Pennsylvania
and Illinois were scarce, 10 6 but decisions finding such violations by state
government officials in Georgia and Louisiana were plentiful, signifithat the federal outlay reflects greater opportunity to violate equal protection than the
state outlay does. To be sure, something like direct comparisons are plausible in a few
areas. For example, both federal and state governments empanel criminal juries, albeit
under nonidentical circumstances, and one could count the number of juries that each
government or kind of government empanels per year, in order to compare the rates at
which courts find prosecutors to have exercised unconstitutional race-based peremptory
challenges. The results of that particular comparison show that courts are much more
likely to find unconstitutional behavior on the part of state prosecutors than they are on
the part of federal prosecutors. See infra text accompanying notes 111-113. But the
possibility of this kind of direct comparison between federal and state activities is more the
exception than the rule.
106. This conclusion is based on two separate searches through the Westlaw databases
housing all reported cases with legal force in Pennsylvania and Illinois (i.e., PA-CS-ALL
and IL-CS-ALL). The searches were conducted for the years 1955 to 1964 and looked for
the term "equal protection" occurring in conjunction with any of the words "black,"
"Negro," "African," "white," or "Caucasian." No cases finding equal protection violations
on the basis of racial discrimination were found, although several cases were found in
which the state governments were found to have violated equal protection on nonracial
grounds. See, e.g., La Salle Nat'l Bank of Chi. v. County of Cook, 145 N.E.2d 65, 68-70
(Ill. 1957) (holding that a zoning scheme violated equal protection in its treatment of
different kinds of real property); Butcher v. Bloom, 203 A.2d 556, 564 (Pa. 1964) (holding
that a state voting apportionment system violated equal protection because of the unequal
number of voters in different districts).
The absence of reported cases finding unconstitutional racial discrimination does not
mean that these states did not discriminate on the basis of race. On the contrary, the case
law does reveal activity that we now recognize as racially discriminatory. See, e.g., People v.
Dukes, 169 N.E.2d 84, 88 (Ill. 1960) (holding, prior to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986), that a prosecutor's use of peremptory strikes to exclude all five potential black
jurors from a trial jury did not violate equal protection); In re Estate of Stephen Girard,
127 A.2d 287, 295 (Pa. 1956) (holding that public authorities could constitutionally
administer a charitable trust designated only for whites without violating equal protection,
because the discrimination was that of a private actor rather than that of the state), rev'd
sub nom. Pennsylvania v. Bd. of Dirs. of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957). On remand from
the U.S. Supreme Court, the state Orphans' Court chose to privatize the orphanage rather
than integrate it, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the decision. See In re
Girard Coll. Trusteeship, 138 A.2d 844, 851-54 (Pa. 1958) (holding that the privatization
did not compromise appellants' civil rights).
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candy exceeding the number of cases finding federal violations not just
10 7
during that decade but at any time then or since.
Although they have not been completely eliminated, these regional
differences have diminished with time. By the 1990s, there was only one
context in which any significant number of unconstitutional race discrimination cases arose in any of these four states-Batson violations,10 8 for
which I estimate there have been between 250 and 300 reported cases.1 0 9
107. For cases from Georgia, see, e.g., Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879, 879
(1955) (per curiam) (directing district court to enter decree requiring desegregation of
municipal golf courses); Cobb v. Balkcom, 339 F.2d 95, 102 (5th Cir. 1964) (overturning
criminal conviction because grand jury and trial jury systematically excluded blacks);
Whitus v. Balkcom, 333 F.2d 496, 509-10 (5th Cir. 1964) (same); Bell v. Ga. Dental Ass'n,
231 F. Supp. 299, 301 (N.D. Ga. 1964) (prohibiting state dental association from excluding
black dentists); Gaines v. Dougherty County Bd. of Educ., 222 F. Supp. 166, 169 (M.D. Ga.
1963) (ordering school desegregation); Anderson v. Courson, 203 F. Supp. 806, 810 (M.D.
Ga. 1962) (forbidding maintenance of racially segregated voting lists); Coke v. City of
Atlanta, 184 F. Supp. 579, 585 (N.D. Ga. 1960) (requiring restaurant in municipal airport
to serve black customers on the same basis as white customers); Calhoun v. Members of Bd.
of Educ., 188 F. Supp. 401, 403 (N.D. Ga. 1959) (finding continuing racial discrimination
in the Atlanta public schools), aft'd, 309 F.2d 638 (5th Cir. 1962); Hunt v. Arnold, 172 F.
Supp. 847, 856-57 (N.D. Ga. 1959) (requiring Georgia State College of Business
Administration to admit qualified black applicants); Allen v. State, 137 S.E.2d 711, 713 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1964) (finding systematic exclusion of blacks from jury list); Glass v. State, 136
S.E.2d 199, 200 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964) (overturning criminal conviction because blacks had
been systematically excluded from jury).
Examples for Louisiana include Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 403-04 (1964)
(striking down statute requiring that race of each candidate be printed on election
ballots); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584, 587-89 (1958) (quashing indictment in which
officials systematically excluded blacks from grand juries); Bd. of Supervisors v. Ludley, 252
F.2d 372, 375 (5th Cir. 1958) (invalidating state university condition of admission that was
applied to exclude black students); Orleans Parish Sch. Bd. v. Bush, 242 F.2d 156, 164 (5th
Cir. 1957) (holding racial segregation of public schools in Orleans Parish
unconstitutional); LaGarde v. Recreation & Park Comm'n, 229 F. Supp. 379, 383 (E.D. La.
1964) (striking practice of denying blacks access to city recreational facilities); United
States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353, 355-56 (E.D. La. 1963) (invalidating state
constitutional requirement that applicants for voter registration "'understand and give a
reasonable interpretation of any section' of the Constitutions of Lousiana or the United
States" (citation omitted)); United States v. Wilder, 222 F. Supp. 749, 753 (W.D. La. 1963)
(invalidating removal of 85% of black voters from rolls of parish due to alleged deficiencies
in their original applications); Bynum v. Schiro, 219 F. Supp. 204, 209, 210-11 (E.D. La.
1963) (ordering integration of municipal auditorium and an end to its systematic
exclusion of organizations such as the NAACP); McCain v. Davis, 217 F. Supp. 661, 663
(E.D. La. 1963) (striking down state law forbidding "'white' hotels to provide
accommodations for Negroes"); United States v. Lassiter, 203 F. Supp. 20, 25 (W.D. La.
1962) (ordering integration of railroad waiting rooms); Hall v. St. Helena Parish Sch. Bd.,
197 F. Supp. 649, 655 (E.D. La. 1961) (invalidating state statute converting public schools
into private schools to evade integration), aftd, 368 U.S. 515 (1962); Dorsey v. State
Athletic Comm'n, 168 F. Supp. 149, 152-53 (E.D. La. 1958) (granting temporary
injunction preventing state from enforcing ban on interracial boxing matches).
108. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986) (forbidding the practice of
peremptorily striking jurors during voir dire on the basis of race).
109. According to one study of reported decisions, there were 165 occasions between
1986 and 1993 on which criminal defendants successfully challenged peremptory jury
strikes on equal protection grounds. See Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We
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These violations have occurred disproportionately in Southern states, but
the disparity is smaller than the disparity in equal protection violations a
generation earlier and may have lessened further since Batson was decided in 1986.110
More stark is the difference between the number of cases finding
state Batson violations and the number finding federal Batson violations.
Since Batson, there has been only one reported instance of a federal prosHave Learned About Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 447, 459
(1996). The study does not specify how many of these 165 cases involved race-based
peremptories rather than other kinds, such as sex-based peremptories, but it does indicate
that out of the entire universe of unconstitutional peremptory challenges-in civil as well
as criminal cases, and as exercised by the lawyers for either side-179 out of 195, or 92%,
involved race-based strikes of black or Hispanic jurors. See id. at 463. Taking that
proportion as instructive, I assume that roughly 92% of the 165 successful Batson claims by
criminal defendants are claims of discrimination against blacks or Hispanics. That yields
an approximate figure of 152 for the years 1986 to 1993. For the years between 2000 and
2002, my own searches of cases citing Batson have identified forty more, some of them state
court decisions on direct review and others federal court decisions reviewing state
proceedings on petitions for habeas corpus. Interpolating from the averages of roughly
twenty cases per year in the early period and ten cases per year in the later period, I
estimate that there are on average roughly fifteen cases per year for the years between 1994
and 1999, or ninety more cases in all. That yields an estimated total of roughly 280
reported Batson violations by state prosecutors between 1986 and 2002.
For the cases between 2000 and 2002, see Daniels v. Roe, No. 02-55328, 2002 U.S. App.
LEXIS 26777 (9th Cir. Dec. 20, 2002) (reviewing challenge to California state court
conviction); Eagle v. Linahan, 279 F.3d 926 (11 th Cir. 2001) (Georgia); Riley v. Taylor, 277
F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2001) (Delaware); Rideau v. Whitley, 237 F.3d 472 (5th Cir. 2000)
(Louisiana); McClain v. Prunty, 217 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 2000) (California); Grate v.
Stinson, 224 F. Supp. 2d 496 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Hardcastle v. Horn, No. 98-CV-3028, 2001
WL 722781 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 2001); Durant v. Strack, 151 F. Supp. 2d 226 (E.D.N.Y.
2001); Rankins v. Carey, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Yancey v. State, 813 So. 2d
1 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001); Giles v. State, 815 So. 2d 585 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000); McElemore
v. State, 798 So. 2d 693 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000); Lucy v. State, 785 So. 2d 1174 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2000); State v. Lucas, 18 P.3d 160 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001); Rose v. State, 35 S.W.3d 365
(Ark. Ct. App. 2000); Burnett v. State, 27 S.W.3d 454 (Ark. Ct. App. 2000); People v. Silva,
21 P.3d 769 (Cal. 2001); People v. McGee, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 309 (Ct. App. 2002); People v.
Turner, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (Ct. App. 2001); People v. Gray, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 848 (Ct.
App. 2001); State v. Rigual, 771 A.2d 939 (Conn. 2001); Fleming v. State, 825 So. 2d 1027
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Brown v. State, 568 S.E.2d 62 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002); Graham v.
State, 738 N.E.2d 1096 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); Washington v. Commonwealth, 34 S.W.3d 376
(Ky. 2000); State v. Harris, 820 So. 2d 471 (La. 2002); State v. Myers, 761 So. 2d 498 (La.
2000); State v. Lewis, 795 So. 2d 468 (La. Ct. App. 2001); Commonwealth v. Calderon, 725
N.E.2d 182 (Mass. 2000); Commonwealth v. Cavotta, 724 N.E.2d 332 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000);
Bogan v. State, 811 So. 2d 286 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001); Robinson v. State, 773 So. 2d 943
(Miss. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Marlowe, 89 S.W.3d 464 (Mo. 2002); People v. Burroughs,
744 N.Y.S.2d 608 (App. Div. 2002); People v. Campos, 736 N.Y.S.2d 108 (App. Div. 2002);
People v. Pierrot, 735 N.Y.S.2d 589 (App. Div. 2001); People v. Lopez, 725 N.Y.S.2d 339
(App. Div. 2001); People v. Mclndoe, 715 N.Y.S.2d 734 (App. Div. 2000); State v. Walker,
742 N.E.2d 1173 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000); Commonwealth v. Basemore, 744 A.2d 717 (Pa.
2000).
110. According to Melilli's study, about two-thirds of the Batson violations reported
between 1986 and 1993 occurred in former slave states. See Melilli, supra note 109, at 468
tbl. F-4. In my own survey of cases decided between 2000 and 2002, the figure was 18 out
of 40, or just under 50%. See cases cited supra note 109.
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ecutor exercising a race-based peremptory challenge."' 1 Even considering that state prosecutors empanel approximately twenty times as many
juries as federal prosecutors, 1 12 the rate of Batson violations by federal
113
prosecutors is far less than the rate of violation by state prosecutors.
In the fifty years since Boiling, then, the number of cases finding unconstitutional federal racial discrimination against nonwhites has been
considerably smaller than the number of cases finding such discrimination by states. Unsurprisingly, the number of state cases varies from state
to state and from the beginning to the end of the relevant time period.
111. See United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 821-22 (9th Cir. 1992) (reversing a
criminal conviction after concluding that a federal prosecutor had exercised a race-based
peremptory challenge during jury selection).
112. In the year from October 1999 to September 2000, the federal district courts
conducted approximately three thousand jury trials in criminal cases. See Bureau of
Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics, 2000, at 56
(2000). I have been unable to locate a source giving a similar comprehensive statistic for
all of the state courts, but the Conference of State Court Administrators, the State Justice
Institute, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, and the National Center for State Courts' Court
Statistics Project have jointly compiled statistics for twenty-six participating states. See
Examining the Work of State Courts, 1999-2000 (Brian J. Ostrom et al. eds., 2001); see
also Jeffrey Abramson, We the Jury 251 (1994) (noting that approximately one-third of the
states do not publish the number of trials they conduct). According to the study
conducted by Ostrom et al., these twenty-six states collectively conducted approximately
44,000 criminal jury trials during 1999. Examining the Work of State Courts, 1999-2000,
supra, at 68 (data calculated from chart showing manner of disposition for criminal cases
filed in twenty-six states, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia). The twenty-six
participating states-which are spread geographically throughout the country-have about
two-thirds of the national population, so I estimate that the total number of criminal jury
trials in state courts during 1999 was about 66,000. That number is 22 times the number of
federal criminal jury trials for roughly the same period.
113. In the federal district courts, the default rule is that voir dire is conducted mostly
from the bench. Judicial Conference of the U.S., Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts,
Handbook for Trial Jurors Serving in the United States District Court, available at http://
www.wiwd.uscourts.gov/assets/pdf/aopj.pdf (last modified Dec. 13, 2003) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review). This practice goes a long way toward explaining why there are
almost no Batson violations in federal trials. But it cannot be a complete explanation. The
practice of judges conducting voir dire is not mandatory, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(a)
(stating thatjudges have discretion to allow counsel to conduct voir dire in criminal cases),
and even when judges conduct the voir dire, it is the prosecuting attorneys who exercise
peremptory strikes. See, e.g., United States v. Lucas, 357 F.3d 599, 609 (6th Cir. 2004)
(addressing claim of racial discrimination in prosecutor's peremptory challenge in cocaine
case); United States v. Wilson, 355 F.3d 358, 363 (5th Cir. 2003) (same); United States v.
Brown, 352 F.3d 654, 661, 670-71 (2d Cir. 2003) (addressing claim that prosecutor
violated Batson in striking black juror in mail fraud case). It should also be noted that a
judge's conducting voir dire rather than leaving it to the lawyers is no guarantee that the
voir dire will not be discriminatory. Judges are imperfect, and allegations that federal
judges discriminate in jury selection are not unknown. Cf. Hobby v. United States, 468
U.S. 339, 341-42 (1984) (addressing claim that district court judge discriminated against
blacks and women in selecting grand jury foreman). But for such discrimination to give
rise to a successful reverse incorporation claim, an appellate federal court would have to
find and declare that one of their district court colleagues had violated the constitutional
rule. Whether for reasons of comity, difficulty of proof, or underlying innocence, that has
never happened.
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Some states have had very few such cases, such that their records of losing
racial equal protection challenges do not appear meaningfully different
from that of the federal government. In other states, especially in the
South and especially early in the period, cases finding unconstitutional
discrimination by state officials have been much more common, far exceeding the number of cases finding federal discrimination. The number
of state race-based equal protection violations has diminished over time,
such that regional differences are no longer as pronounced. But the
number of such violations by state parties, especially in some states, is
large enough to suggest that the absence of federal cases calls for a distinctive explanation.
III. UNSATISFACTORY EXPLANATIONS

This Part considers and largely rejects three possible explanations
for the absence of reported decisions finding unconstitutional racial discrimination by the federal government. The first of these is that the federal government's limited jurisdiction prevents it from engaging in much
racial discrimination, because the areas of life in which racial discrimination arises as a problem-schooling, for example-are mostly the province of state rather than federal governance. The second is that the political dynamics of the "extended republic" help keep the federal
government friendly to the interests of minority groups, racial or otherwise. The third is that even if the federal government would have engaged in unconstitutional racial discrimination had it been permitted to
do so, judicial articulation of the reverse incorporation doctrine has
caused the government to alter its behavior, internalizing the rule into its
decisionmaking process. On this third explanation, reverse incorporation might well have been necessary for eliminating federal discrimination, and the absence of successor cases to Bolling would testify to the
successful achievement of the doctrine's aim.
All of these hypotheses are weak. The first two fail because there is
in fact a significant historical record of racial discrimination by the federal government. It therefore cannot be the case that the federal government lacks opportunities to discriminate. Nor can it be the case that the
political structure of the federal government prevents all such discrimination-though it still may be true that those political dynamics keep the
federal government more friendly to the interests of racial minority
groups than many state governments, or even than the median state government. The third hypothesis may also have a small amount of explanatory power, but it cannot account for much of the phenomenon being
analyzed, because there is little or no historical evidence that federal officials changed their behavior to account for the changed constitutional
rule. Indeed, reverse incorporation demanded little change from official
federal policy as it existed in 1954. That fact, which is the basis for a
better explanation of the absence of cases, will be explored in Part V.
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A. The Opportunity to Discriminate
The federal government is, at least officially, a government of limited
jurisdiction, and most of the canonical cases striking down governmentsponsored racial discrimination deal with subjects that are outside those
limits. They concern matters that are characteristically the province of
state regulation, including schools, 114 property,'1 5 the family,' 16 and so
on. 117 If that pattern reflected where government-sponsored discrimina114. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (invalidating racial
segregation in public schools).
115. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20-23 (1948) (declaring racially
restrictive covenant in real property deed unenforceable).
116. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967) (invalidating restrictions on
interracial marriage).
117. It is here worth noting another basic area of law that is mostly handled by states
and that is often the site of racial discrimination, but that is not on the present list: law
enforcement. Criminal law was a major locus of racial discrimination early in the history of
constitutional equal protection, see Leon F. Litwack, Been in the Storm So Long: The
Aftermath of Slavery 366-71, 375 (1979) (discussing the prescription of differential
criminal penalties for offenders of different races), and questionable uses of race remain
common in contemporary enforcement as well, see, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y.
Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 Mich. L.
Rev. 651, 653-60 (2002) (describing the use of racial profiling in law enforcement).
Nonetheless, with the exception of rulings addressing the process of jury selection, see,
e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84-89 (1986); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,
203-04 (1965); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879),judicial intervention
into the enforcement process has been framed in terms of race-neutral rules under the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments rather than in terms of equal protection. See, e.g.,
Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 Mich. L. Rev.
2001, 2002 (1998). Thus, despite the pervasive use of race in law enforcement, see id. at
2005-06, there are almost no reported cases in which any law enforcement authoritiesstate or federal-are held to violate equal protection. See Gross & Barnes, supra, at
725-26 & n.214 (stating that NewJersey is the only jurisdiction in which evidence can be
excluded due to a racially motivated search); Karlan, supra, at 2004 (arguing that the
standard remedies available to criminal defendants-suppression of evidence, dismissal of
indictment, reversal of conviction, and civil damages-are either unavailable or ineffective
for litigants claiming racial discrimination in law enforcement).
This pattern is the product of several factors, some doctrinal and some practical.
Contemporary doctrine is shaped by McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), which
establishes prohibitive statistical standards for the demonstration of racially selective
enforcement or prosecution, and City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), under
which it is almost impossible for a person injured by the police to sue for injunctive relief,
because standing is limited to people who can show that they, individually, are likely to be
injured in the same way in the future. Practically, criminal defendants tend to be
unsympathetic litigants and often lack high-quality legal counsel and other resources
necessary to mount serious litigation. See Gross & Barnes, supra, at 726-27. When people
alleging discrimination in law enforcement do sue for civil damages, they are often
outsiders in the venues where they must sue and are therefore further disadvantaged in
jury proceedings. See Karlan, supra, at 2012 (noting that this is especially true of litigants
who have been racially profiled). The exceptional cases where litigants have stronger civil
claims usually settle, leaving no judicial findings of unconstitutional discrimination. See
Gross & Barnes, supra, at 727. The combined force of these influences yields the result
that courts very rarely find equal protection violations in law enforcement at any level, state
or federal. Accordingly, the fact that most criminal law enforcement in the United States is
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tion generally occurs, then cases finding equal protection violations
might overwhelmingly involve state law simply because it is state law that
applies in the relevant areas.
The trouble with this hypothesis is that many areas of federal jurisdiction do present opportunities for racial discrimination. For example,
the federal government is a large employer, and the civil service could be
and in many aspects has been racially segregated. 118 So was the military.'1 9 Federal contracts and subsidies could be and have been allocated
on racially discriminatory bases. 120 Federal law enforcement has long
been sufficiently extensive and sufficiently street-level to afford many opconducted at the state level is unlikely to be a significant part of the reason that few cases
find unconstitutional racial discrimination at the federal level.
118. See, e.g.,John Hope Franklin & Alfred A. Moss, Jr., From Slavery to Freedom 324
(7th ed. 1994) (noting that President Wilson, by executive order, racially segregated
federal eating and restroom facilities); Michael J. Klarman, Race and the Court in the
Progressive Era, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 884, 915 (1998) (describing Wilson administration's
segregation of facilities in Treasury, Post Office, and Navy departments); see also Desmond
King, Separate and Unequal: Black Americans and the U.S. Federal Government 72-76
(1995) (discussing 1943 study showing that black government employees were largely
excluded from professional positions and relegated to clerical or custodial positions).
119. See, e.g., Robert Fredrick Burk, The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil
Rights 23-44 (1984); Donald R. McCoy & Richard T. Ruetten, Quest and Response:
Minority Rights and the Truman Administration 221-50 (1973). Outside the context of
affirmative action, see Berkley v. United States, 287 F.3d 1076, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(requiring that strict scrutiny be applied to military recruiting practice favoring women
and minorities), there have been no successful equal protection challenges to racial
discrimination in the military. There have, however, been successful equal protection
challenges based on sex, see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688-91 (1973)
(invalidating military regulation presuming that male, but not female, service members
needed to support their spouses financially), though of course other instances of military
sex discrimination have been upheld against equal protection challenge, see Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 83 (1981) (upholding practice of requiring only males to register
for draft).
120. The affirmative action version of this phenomenon is familiar from Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), but historically the federal government
frequently discriminated against racial minorities in allocating benefits and contracts. For
example, Congress funded segregated land-grant colleges, see Morrill Act of 1890, ch. 841,
§ 1, 26 Star. 417, 418 (1890) (current version not authorizing segregation at 7 U.S.C. § 323
(2000)) and segregated hospitals, see Hospital Survey and Construction Act, Pub. L. No.
79-725, § 622(f)(1), 60 Stat. 1040, 1043 (1946) (current version not authorizing
segregation at 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (2000)). Federal housing policies discouraged lending
in black neighborhoods and encouraged municipalities to enact racially restrictive zoning
ordinances. See Michael H. Schill & Susan M. Wachter, The Spatial Bias of Federal
Housing Law and Policy: Concentrated Poverty in Urban America, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1285,
1309 (1995). ADC, the major federal welfare program of the 1930s, was administered in
racially discriminatory ways. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Parenthood Divided: A Legal History
of the Bifurcated Law of Parental Relations, 90 Geo. L.J. 299, 358 & n.228 (2002). More
recently, in 1999, the Department of Agriculture settled a class action suit brought by a
large number of African American farmers who alleged that they had for decades been the
victims of discrimination in the processing and allocation of federal loans. See Pigford v.
Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C. 1999), aff'd, 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The
Department of Agriculture never acknowledged liability, but the district court approving
the settlement seemed to take for granted that discrimination had occurred. See id. at 85
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portunities for racial discrimination.1 21 Since September 2001, there has
been a great deal of concern that federal officials would unconstitutionally use race and ethnicity in the course of their activities in the war on
terrorism, 122 Territorial administration, immigration, and Indian law all
bring federal authority to bear on significantly nonwhite populations,
and all afford opportunities for deliberate racial discrimination. 123 Accordingly, the absence of cases finding federal racial discrimination cannot be a function of the federal government's lack of opportunities to
discriminate.
B. The Extended Republic
The historical record of overt racial discrimination by the federal
government also precludes a related hypothesis, one that would focus on
the choice not to discriminate rather than a lack of opportunities to discriminate. According to one reading of Madisonian political theory, one
of the virtues of the federal system is that an "extended republic" consisting of representatives from all of the states is less likely to use governmental power against minority groups than individual state governments
are. 12 4 Experience has not always vindicated this view as applied to racial
("These events were the culmination of a string of broken promises that had been made to
African American farmers for well over a century.").
121. See Gross & Barnes, supra note 117, at 670-72 (describing federal drug
enforcement efforts, including stops of highway motorists).
122. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance, 11 J. Pol.
Phil. 191, 194, 200 (2003) (expressing concern that members of ethnic minority groups
with which people associate the September 11 terrorists face greater threat to civil liberties
than other Americans).
123. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens,
Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81
Tex. L. Rev. 1, 263-64 (2002) (showing how nativist and racist impulses drove U.S. policy
with respect to Indians, immigrants, and territorial inhabitants).
124. The phrase "extended republic" comes from Madison's writings in The Federalist
No. 51 and is used to differentiate the United States from the smaller republics of the
individual states. Madison argued that the greater size of the United States would change
the dynamics of the political process such that minority interest groups would be less
vulnerable than in smaller polities. "In the extended republic of the United States," he
wrote, "and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a
coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles
than those ofjustice and the general good .... " The Federalist No. 51, supra note 29, at
335 (James Madison). Accordingly, there should be "less danger to a minor from the will
of a major party." Id. For discussions of various questions related to this bit of
Madisonianism that are beyond the scope of this Article, see, e.g., Sherman J. Clark, A
Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 434, 478 (1999) (discussing
difference between majority power and popular voice and arguing that representation can
appropriately check the former without limiting the latter); Larry D. Kramer, Madison's
Audience, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 611, 616 (1999) (arguing that Madison's theory had little
influence in his own time); Alexandra Natapoff, Note, Trouble in Paradise: Equal
Protection and the Dilemma of Interminority Group Conflict, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1059, 1079,
1087 (1995) (relying on Madison's theory to argue that the structure of the federal
government will yield benign race-conscious legislation). In this issue of this law review,
James Liebman and Brandon Garrett explore the role of Madison's proposed national
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minorities: Particular states have often been more responsive to the interests of minority groups than the federal government has. 12 5 Nonetheless, it may well be true that the federal political process tends, in the
aggregate, to be more responsive to the interests of racial minority groups
than are the political processes of most states. It is therefore tempting to
explain the absence of cases finding unconstitutional federal racial discrimination by reference to the extended republic's tendency to reject
discriminatory measures in the political process, before the need for a
judicially enforceable rule arises.
This approach might well explain some portion of the differing frequencies with which the federal and state governments are held to violate
equal protection. It cannot, however, account for the fact that the number of cases finding federal violations is almost nil. For the extended
republic theory to fully explain the absence of cases finding violations,
the dynamics of the extended republic would have to prevent discrimination from occurring at all. That cannot be the case, because the federal
government has historically engaged in a fair amount of racial discrimination. As noted in the preceding subsection, examples include
the segregation of the military and the civil service, 126 the discriminatory
allocation of federal financial benefits, 12 7 and the pervasive racism of immigration law, 128 to say nothing of federal policy
toward Native Americans 129 or the Japanese internment during World
negative as an equal protection constraint in the extended republic. James S. Liebman &
Brandon Garrett, Madisonian Equal Protection, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 837 (2004).
125. For example, many states passed Fair Employment Laws banning racial
discrimination in private employment before Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. See Anthony S. Chen, From Fair Employment to Equal Employment
Opportunity and Beyond: Affirmative Action and the Politics of Civil Rights in the New
Deal Order, 1941-1972, at 116-55 (2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
California, Berkeley) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). And, of course, many states
operated legally desegregated schools while federally operated schools in the District of
Columbia and elsewhere were still legally segregated. See Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil
Rights, supra note 11, at 311.
126. See supra notes 118-119 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
128. Under the Naturalization Act of 1795, only "white persons" could immigrate to
the United States and become citizens. The Naturalization Act, ch. 20, §1, 1 Stat. 414, 414
(1795) (repealed 1802). Africans became eligible to be naturalized in 1870, but foreignborn Asians could not become naturalized American citizens until 1952. Before that date,
the courts frequently had to adjudicate the question of whether a particular immigrant was
white. See, e.g., United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 213-15 (1923)
(rejecting the naturalization petition of an immigrant from India); Takao Ozawa v. United
States, 260 U.S. 178, 198-99 (1922) (rejecting the naturalization petition of a Japanese
immigrant); see also Lucy E. Salyer, Laws Harsh as Tigers: Chinese Immigrants and the
Shaping of Modern Immigration Law 7-14 (1995) (discussing discriminatory immigration
laws such as the Page Law of 1875 and the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882); Rogers M.
Smith, Civic Ideals 13-39 (1997) (analyzing American citizenship requirements as
pervasively discriminatory).
129. Cleveland, supra note 123, at 25-81 (noting examples of exploitative and racist
federal action, including limitations on Indian land rights in favor of white settlement,
restrictions on liquor sales, forced expulsion, and limitations on equal citizenship).
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War 11.130 Courts have not used constitutional rules to check the federal
government's discriminatory practices in these areas, but that fact cannot
reflect an absence of discriminatory conduct, because the existence of
discriminatory conduct is clearly established. The extended republic may
reduce federal discrimination to a level below that of the average state,
but it has not eliminated such discrimination. Accordingly, the extended
republic hypothesis might explain why there are fewer reported federal
violations than state violations, but it cannot explain the nearly complete
absence of reported federal violations.
The federal government's historical discrimination in these various
realms should call into question the intuition that areas of state regulation, such as schools, are at the core of governmental racial discrimination. Why, after all, should the segregation of schools be more central to
the problem of racial equality than the segregation of armies, practiced
by the federal government, or the segregation of employment, practiced
by both state and federal governments? One reason might be the pervasiveness of schooling. School is a formative experience for almost every
American. But for the two generations whose schooling occurred after
segregation officially ended-and especially for the lawyers among
them-the centrality of schools to the history of discrimination is also
shaped by another factor: Schools were a prominent area of judicial intervention. Because legal training focuses on the work of courts, lawyers
thinking of areas where racial discrimination is a problem will naturally
think most about areas where courts have intervened. Courts have also
intervened against official racial discrimination in other areas of state regulation, such as property1 3 1 and family law. 132 When we think of the substantive areas of unconstitutional discrimination, these examples come
readily to mind, and they create an image of racial discrimination as a
state-law problem. That image is misleading, because the absence of
court cases dismantling racial discrimination in the military, the civil service, or immigration laws does not reflect an absence of underlying federal discrimination.
C. Internalizing the Rule: Doctrine as Cause
Many of the leading examples of overt federal discrimination discussed in the previous subsection, such as the segregation of the military
and the civil service, occurred before Boling was decided-that is, before
the courts established the rule that equal protection applies to the federal
government. One might therefore wonder whether the judicial an130. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 233-42 (1944) (Murphy,J., dissenting)
(describing racist underpinnings of military order to intern more than 112,000 Japanese
Americans).
131. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20-23 (1948) (declaring racially
restrictive covenant in real property deed unenforceable).
132. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433-34 (1984) (reversing state court
decision divesting custody from woman involved in an interracial relationship); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (invalidating restrictions on interracial marriage).
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nouncement of reverse incorporation caused the government to behave
differently than it had before that rule was established. Perhaps Bolling's
deterrent effect, and its more diffuse influence on the norms that shape
notions of right conduct, have prevented the government from engaging
in discrimination that it would have practiced had Bolling not been decided. On this understanding, the absence of post-Boiling cases holding
the federal government to have discriminated unconstitutionally against
members of racial minority groups would testify to Bolling's comprehensive success in reforming federal conduct.
This is a hypothesis worth testing. One of the chief functions of law
is to influence behavior, and much of our understanding of law assumes
that most people will seek to conform their conduct to what the law requires, whether from a sense of simple obligation1 3 3 or because the system of legal incentives and deterrents makes it instrumentally rational for
them to do so. 1 3 4 Although special complications arise when the party
supposed to conform its conduct to a legal rule is a government or a
government official rather than a private person,1 35 it is reasonable to
expect the federal government to try to comply with clear constitutional
commands, at least most of the time.
How well an internalization hypothesis can account for the absence
of post-Boling cases finding unconstitutional federal racial discrimination
is a question that should be answered empirically. Even if federal conduct after 1954 largely conformed to the demands of equal protection, it
would still be necessary to show that reverse incorporation was the cause
of that conforming behavior, rather than simply coincidentally convergent with it. 136 That showing of causation, it turns out, is hard to make
on the relevant historical record. A major reason for the difficulty is that
the federal government had, for the most part, already abandoned policies of overt racial discrimination before Boling was decided. Accordingly, there was little official policy for reverse incorporation to change.
A great deal of racial discrimination persisted unofficially, and perhaps
13 7
Boling played a role in reducing that unauthorized discrimination.
But as explained below, factors including subconstitutional rules against
133. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 82-90 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing the
idea of legal obligation as understood from the internal point of view of the person
bound).
134. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents 26-29 (1970) (arguing that
incentives offered by tort law change behavior so as to alter the number and kind of
accidents that will occur); Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The
Model of Precaution, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 5-8 (1985) (describing how "injurer responds [to
simple negligence rule] by minimally fulfilling the legal standard of care, so that even a
small reduction in his care will cause him to be liable").
135. See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 345, 347 (2000) (analyzing ways in
which government officials, unlike private parties, do not respond to standard legal
deterrents like monetary damages); see also infra Part III.C.2.
136. See Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27J. Legal Stud. 661, 680 (1998)
(describing internalization as "a variable to be explored, not a condition to be assumed").
137. I thank Evan Caminker for suggesting the term "unauthorized discrimination."
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discrimination have left such unauthorized discrimination relatively insensitive to the constitutional rule.
1. Official Discrimination.- If the absence of cases holding the federal government to have violated the equal protection rights of racial minority groups were due to the impact of Bolling and reverse incorporation
on government decisionmaking, then the government would have abandoned its discriminatory policies within a reasonable time after the rule
was announced. As it happens, however, the timing was otherwise. By
the time the Supreme Court decided Boling in 1954, little in official federal policy violated the demands of equal protection as applied to matters
of race.
Although issues regarding the rule of intentionality in equal protection have been much contested, the courts since Bolling have limited the
application of equal protection doctrine to discrimination that can be
characterized as overt or intentional. 138 By 1954, the federal government
had largely abandoned those forms of discrimination, at least as matters
of official policy. Presidents Roosevelt and Truman had already issued
executive orders banning discrimination in federal employment. 13 9 Tru-

man had also ordered the desegregation of the armed forces. 140 Congress amended the immigration laws to eliminate race as a basis for denying naturalized citizenship. 14 The Eisenhower administration had
ordered the desegregation of federally operated schools on military bases.' 42 In the District of Columbia, restaurants and hotels were required
138. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (holding that only overt or
intentional discrimination triggers heightened scrutiny). For differing views on the intent
requirement, see Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub.
Aff. 107, 146 (1976) (concluding that if the goal is improving welfare of disadvantaged
groups, intent rule may not be appropriate); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal
Protection, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1105, 1150 (1989) (arguing that intent doctrine offers court
flexibility to consider individual and societal interests); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory
Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 935, 956 (1989) (arguing that intent
standard will result in incoherence and an amorphous inquiry).
139. See Exec. Order No. 9980, 13 Fed. Reg. 4311 (July 26, 1948) ("All personnel
actions taken by Federal appointing officers shall be based solely on merit and fitness; and
such officers are authorized and directed to take appropriate steps to insure that in all
such actions there shall be no discrimination because of race, color, religion, or national
origin."); Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (June 25, 1941) ("All contracting
agencies of the Government of the United States shall include in all defense contracts
hereafter negotiated by them a provision obligating the contractor not to discriminate
against any worker because of race, creed, color, or national origin .... ).
140. See Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 26, 1948) ("[T]here shall be
equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard
to race, color, religion or national origin ....); see also McCoy & Ruetten, supra note 119,
at 129-30 (explaining that Executive Order 9981 was politically significant because the
issue of antidiscrimination in the military was part of both major party platforms during
the 1948 presidential election).
141. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163,
239 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1422) (specifying that the right to "become a
naturalized citizen of the United States shall not be denied or abridged because of race").
142. See Burk, supra note 119, at 29 (explaining that although the administration
issued an executive order banning segregation, "[t]he declaration actually only affected
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by law to serve patrons without regard to race.' 43 The continuing dejure
segregation of the District's schools was thus an outlier within federal policy when Bolling was decided. After Boling, few instances of official discrimination remained to which the reverse incorporation rule could be
applied.
In part for that reason, the federal bureaucracy does not seem to
have reacted to the decision in any significant way. On the day after Bolling was decided, President Eisenhower met personally with District of Columbia officials and directed them to comply quickly with the order to
desegregate the District's public schools. 144 But there does not seem to
be any record of federal officials discussing whether Bolling required
other changes in existing federal policy, much less initiating4 5a process of
reform designed to comply with a new constitutional rule.'
Because Boling can be read to have stopped short of imposing the
full apparatus of equal protection doctrine on the federal government, it
is also worth considering whether the doctrinal change that might have
provoked changes in federal policy was not the rule articulated in Bolling
but the later development of full-fledged reverse incorporation. As explained in Part I, Boling read narrowly holds only that discrimination
lacking any legitimate governmental purpose violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. It would be another twenty years before
one school... for schools at five other bases already had begun to desegregate"). Schools
operated jointly by federal and state authorities located on military bases in states with de
jure school segregation did not desegregate until after Brown. Id. at 30-32.
143. The laws forbidding discrimination by restaurant and hotel operators in the
District of Columbia had been adopted in 1872 and 1873, before the end of
Reconstruction. The laws subsequently fell into disuse, and in practice many restaurant
and hotel operators refused to serve black customers. Shortly after the Second World War,
however, the District government began to enforce the law again, and in 1953 the
Supreme Court upheld the validity of the 1873 antidiscrimination law against a claim that
it had been implicitly repealed or become unenforceable through long disuse. See District
of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 113-14 (1953). The Eisenhower
Administration was publicly committed to eliminating remaining segregation in the
District of Columbia even before Boiling was decided. See Notes on the President's
Meeting with Congressional Leaders (Mon., Jan. 26, 1953), in 12 Civil Rights, The White
House, and the Justice Department, 1945-1968, at 108, 114 (Michal R. Belknap ed., 1991)
[hereinafter Notes on the President's Meeting] ("The President stated his intention of
using the full power of the President to do away with segregation in the District of
Columbia .... ."); Burk, supra note 119, at 16, 18, 49 (describing Eisenhower's position as
articulated during his 1952 campaign and in his 1953 State of the Union address).
144. Burk, supra note 119, at 55 (describing meeting between President Eisenhower
and local officials).
145. Each year, the Attorney General files an annual report on the activities of the
Justice Department. These reports, which are each several hundred pages in length, are
comprehensive descriptions of the activities of all branches of the Department of Justice,
including the Office of Legal Counsel. Accordingly, they regularly contain reports on
consequential changes in the law during the relevant years. The reports for 1954, 1955,
and 1956 are devoid of any discussion of Boling or its consequences for federal policy. See
Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep. 1956; Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep. 1955; Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep. 1954. The New
York Times, Wall Street Journa4 and Washington Post did not report on any governmental
reactions to, or planned changes in light of, Boling.
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the Court would make the simple declaration that equal protection applies against the federal government in the same way that it applies
against the states, 146 and the question of whether that equal application
really extended to every aspect of equal protection law-and in particular
to affirmative action-remained contested for another twenty years after
that.' 47 One might therefore wonder whether the federal bureaucracy's
failure to treat Bolling as a stimulus for thoroughgoing reform was simply
a function of Bolling's not having demanded very much. Perhaps reverse
incorporation caused significant changes in the government's racial policies, but not until later cases expanded Boling into a complete application of equal protection to the federal government.
This more nuanced understanding of the development of reverse incorporation, however, does not lend much support to the hypothesis that
reverse incorporation could have caused changes in government behavior. Boling described segregation as lacking any legitimate purpose1 48
and racial classifications as constitutionally suspect.' 49 Thus, even if some
gap remained between the antidiscrimination norm binding the federal
government and that binding the states-and it is not clear from subsequent case law that there was in practice such a gap 15 0-Bolling did establish a standard stringent enough to threaten or invalidate any overt racial
discrimination. Accordingly, Boling was sufficient cause for the federal
bureaucracy to reevaluate and change any affected policies, even if it was
not quite tantamount to a full incorporation of equal protection. The
absence of a federal reaction was thus not a function of Bolling's moderate demands. It was more likely a function of reverse incorporation's having arrived too late to play a significant causal role in ending official racial discrimination by the federal government.
2. Unauthorized Discrimination. - One may well still ask, however,
why the reverse incorporation rule was not regularly applied in cases involving federal discrimination outside of, or in contravention of, official
federal policy. After all, there can be a large gap between official policies
of nondiscrimination and nondiscrimination in practice. This is partly a
matter of the practical impossibility of instantaneous reform. No matter
how sincere the intentions of the top decisionmakers, a segregated army
or civil service does not become substantially integrated on the same day
that desegregation is ordered. 1 5 1 Given the sheer size of the federal government's decisionmaking apparatus, a certain amount of discrimination
was bound to persist, and progress toward genuine nondiscrimination
146. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 67.
148. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
149. Id. at 499.
150. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
151. Despite the fact that the military had been officially desegregated before he took
office, President Eisenhower found that segregation in the Armed Forces persisted and
that achieving desegregation would require additional effort. See Notes on the President's
Meeting, supra note 143, at 114.
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was slow in many areas.' 5 2 Moreover, the obstacles to thorough nondiscrimination were not only practical. The federal government is not just
large but also internally ideologically diverse, and many officials with
decisionmaking authority preferred, where possible, to hold on to racially
15 3
discriminatory practices.
It follows that the absence of cases holding unauthorized federal discrimination invalid under Boling cannot be due to reverse incorporation's complete success in changing decisionmakers' ex ante behavior.
That explanation could hold only if discriminatory behavior had in fact
been eliminated, which was not the case. Nor should it be surprising that
the rule was not a perfect deterrent. After all, constitutional text and
judicial doctrine unambiguously applied equal protection against state
and local governments, and the cases holding those governments liable
for unconstitutional racial discrimination show that they and their officials were not entirely deterred.
It does not follow, of course, that reverse incorporation had no effect
on the conduct of would-be discriminators. Even if some amount of discrimination persisted, some federal decisionmakers who would otherwise
have been inclined to discriminate might have altered their behavior due
to the constitutional rule. But the plausible suspicion that the constitutional rule would have changed behavior in this way needs careful unpacking. For one thing, reverse incorporation offered no monetary remedy to deter the unauthorized discriminator; damages were not available
in Fifth Amendment lawsuits until 1979.154 Nor has the subsequent addition of a damage remedy made the classic model of actors induced to
change their behavior by legal rules threatening monetary liability 5 5 applicable to this situation, because government officials tend not to internalize the costs of adverse judgments in the same way that private actors

152. See Burk, supra note 119, at 23-44, 68-88 (describing the patchy progress of
desegregation in the military and the civil service during the 1940s and 1950s); King, supra
note 118 (describing the persistence of segregation within federal agencies before the mid1960s).
153. See King, supra note 118, at 77-108 (describing efforts of some officials to
maintain segregation and discrimination in hiring and promotions).
154. In 1971, the Court ruled that plaintiffs could recover monetary remedies for the
violation of their constitutional rights. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395-97 (1971). In 1979, Davis v. Passman extended that
rule to the Fifth Amendment. 442 U.S. 228, 229-30 (1979). Prior to 1979, plaintiffs
bringing reverse incorporation claims were limited to suits for injunctive relief. Cf. Larson
v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 703-05 (1949) (permitting only
injunctive relief against federal officers for constitutional violations).
155. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 134, at 5-8; Cooter, supra note 134, at 26-29; A.
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 Harv. L.
Rev. 869 (1998) (arguing for punitive damages when chance of escaping liability dilutes
the normal deterrence effect of liability); Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as
Societal Damages, 113 Yale L.J. 347, 363-67 (2003) (analyzing and comparing the
deterrent effects of compensatory and punitive damages through cost internalization).
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do. 15 6 They are likely to be indemnified,1 5 7 and their motivating incen1 58
tives are generally political rather than financial.
156. See Levinson, supra note 135, at 345-47.
157. See Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of
Public Officials' Individual Liability Under Bivens, 88 Geo. L.J. 65, 65-68 (1999) (arguing
that government indemnification for its officers limits the effect of tort actions against
government officials in their individual capacities). The higher-level government officials
who are responsible for the budgets from which the damages must be paid generally
respond to political rather than financial incentives, such that it is very hard to know how
imposing financial costs will affect their behavior. A public official may well commit to a
course of action that will cost the government more than it is worth in financial terms if
nonfinancial political benefits will result, or if the distribution of the overall costs and
benefits will favor the officeholder's supporters. See Levinson, supra note 135, at 345, 357.
158. See Levinson, supra note 135, at 345, 357. To be sure, government behavior
sometimes does respond to the costs of legal liability. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & James
E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of Takings, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 997, 999
(1999) (describing how the requirement to pay just compensation for a taking of private
property will affect governmental decisions about what property to take). Moreover, the
legal system frequently makes use of the assumption that individual officials can be
deterred from undesirable action through the threat of monetary penalties. See, e.g.,
Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional
Remedies, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1731, 1788-89 (1991) (stating view that the system of
remedies for constitutional torts imposes damages to deter unconstitutional government
conduct). It is probably the case, however, that federal officials inclined to commit
constitutional torts face low expected costs. First, relatively few people who are victims of
such constitutional violations actually bring suit. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring
Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as
Private Attorneys General, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 247, 284 (1988) (arguing that deterrent effect
of constitutional litigation may be low because many potential plaintiffs, for example, those
who are incarcerated, face barriers to suit including ignorance of their rights, poverty, and
fear of reprisal, in addition to lack of incentive because of the difficulty of proving an often
intangible harm to an unsympathetic trier of fact). Second, those plaintiffs who do sue
face long odds against winning. According to one study, of 12,000 Bivens actions filed, only
thirty yielded judgments for the plaintiffs, and very few were settled. See Perry M. Rosen,
The Bivens Constitutional Tort: An Unfulfilled Promise, 67 N.C. L. Rev. 337, 343-44
(1989); see also id. at 347-48 (attributing small success rate to, among other things, ajury's
reluctance to award damages when officials are not indemnified). And as noted above,
even when the plaintiff does succeed in extracting a monetary award, the named
defendant is usually indemnified. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
To be sure, the threat of litigation attaches certain expected financial costs to
unconstitutional conduct even if government officials can be confident that they will not
have to pay damage awards. Notably, litigation is expensive even for the prevailing party.
Officeholders may not bear the costs of litigation in the way that private parties would, but
they may still prefer to preserve their budgets for other purposes. See, e.g., William A.
Niskanen, A Reflection on Bureaucracy and Representative Government, in The BudgetMaximizing Bureaucrat: Appraisals and Evidence 13, 19 (Andr6 Blais & Sttphane Dion
eds., 1991) (outlining areas of spending such as staff and capital). Still, some officials may
be perfectly happy to spend the public fisc on litigation. It is, after all, not the officials'
own money, and indeed the money often comes from separate litigation funds or from
liability insurance rather than from a fund that would otherwise support the responsible
official's nonlitigation activities. If it is to an official's political, personal, or bureaucratic
advantage to act unconstitutionally, the expense of litigation is therefore less likely to deter
her than to deter a private actor whose incentives are monetary and who bears his own
litigation costs. Moreover-and this is a consideration applicable at the level of official
policy as well as individual deviation-compliance with a constitutional norm is sometimes
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Monetary incentives and deterrents are not the only mechanisms
through which law affects behavior. Law also exerts influence through its
effects on social norms, the market, or other circumstances that people
consider when deciding how to behave. 159 Most ambitiously, judicial articulation of a system of constitutional values in which racial discrimination is reprehensible might shape the normative atmosphere in which
government officials act, making them less likely to want to discriminate
in the first place.1 60 More moderately, the judicial articulation of such
values could have an indirect effect on would-be discriminators by affecting the norms of their coworkers and superiors, who would then be more
likely to notice and punish discriminatory conduct. In that way, the law's
effect on some people's norms could act as a deterrent for other people
whose own attitudes remain unchanged.
I do not doubt that many federal officials during the 1950s and 1960s
were influenced by the symbolic power of judicially enforced equal protection or, more fundamentally, by the general rise of antidiscrimination
itself costly. Desegregating a school system is expensive, but that is true no matter which
branch of government orders the school desegregated. Indeed, in cases where compliance
is more expensive than noncompliance, the government has a financial interest in delaying
compliance as long as possible, and thus in waiting until a litigated defense of a policy fails,
rather than correcting it in advance of judicial intervention. Cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651, 691-92 (1974) (Marshall,J., dissenting) (arguing that where remedy for violation
is only prospective, states lack incentive to comply ex ante).
159. See Lessig, supra note 136, at 666. Somewhat playfully, Lessig refers to this more
capacious understanding of how people internalize legal rules as the "New Chicago
School" and the more limited theory of direct incentives and deterrents as the "Old
Chicago School." See id. at 665-66. He might just as easily have referred to the more
limited approach as the school of Holmes and the Bad Man. Holmes wrote:
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man,
who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him
to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside
the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 459 (1897).
160. This phenomenon can be further subdivided into two categories. In one, the
courts announce that the Constitution requires X, and although government officials
privately believe Y, they also believe that they should place the Constitution above their
own views and therefore act in accordance with X, not because they fear legal sanction but
because they believe that it is their duty to act constitutionally and they accept the
judiciary's authority to interpret the Constitution. See Sanford Levinson, Constitutional
Faith 56 (1988) (describing the articulated intentions of various officials to follow the
Constitution rather than their own consciences). In the other, the courts announce that
the Constitution requires X, and although government officials had previously believed Y,
they come to believe X instead, because the courts' pronouncements have moral or
persuasive power. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative
Institution?, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 961, 962-65 (1992) (analyzing the role of Supreme Court
decisions in changing public attitudes about constitutional issues); cf. Mark Tushnet,
Renormalizing Bush v. Gore: An Anticipatory Intellectual History, 90 Geo. L.J. 113, 125
(2001) (arguing that the cognitive dissonance required to maintain persistent disbelief in
the validity of a Supreme Court decision can prompt progressives to revise their views and
come to see that decision as valid). For a more skeptical view, see Klarman, From Jim Crow
to Civil Rights, supra note 11, at 464 (arguing that Supreme Court decisions on major
contested normative issues rarely persuade people to change their views).
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norms that the renewed judicial commitment expressed. It does not follow, however, that reverse incorporation was an important part of that
influence. The famous judicial decisions that may have shaped people's
normative views about discrimination were, like Brown v. Board of Education, decisions involving state and local government. 16' If Boling had
never arisen-if, for example, the desegregation of the District of Columbia's schools had been a matter of executive order prior to 1954, as the
desegregation of the military was-it is highly unlikely that the rising
norm against racial discrimination would have been weakened due to the
absence of a judicially articulated rule applying equal protection to the
federal government. In other words, where the shaping of public norms
is concerned, nobody thinks that Bolling had much additional value over
and above Brown. Indeed, the same sense of constitutional values that led
the Boling Court to describe exempting the federal government from
equal protection rules as "unthinkable" would probably also have influenced the independent decisionmaking of most (though not all) federal
legislators and administrators, whether or not reverse incorporation had
162
officially been invented.
161. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (state ban on interracial
marriage); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (state laws permitting or requiring
municipalities to racially segregate public schools); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950)
(state provision of unequal legal education for blacks and for whites); Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948) (state court enforcement of racially discriminatory retrictive covenant in
real property deed); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (state-conducted primary
elections excluding blacks from voting).
162. There is, of course, a further question, which is whether the status of that
antidiscrimination norm among federal decisionmakers would have been different, not in
the absence of reverse incorporation, but ifthe Supreme Court in Boling and other cases
had affirmatively refused to hold the federal government to the same standard to which
the states were held. If so, then perhaps Boling was a meaningful variable among the
influences shaping the normative atmosphere in which federal officials decided whether to
comply with official nondiscrimination policies. There is a valid point here, but it should
not be overstated; a contrary decision in Boling might have had less effect on the
normative atmosphere than is generally supposed. My suspicion on this point derives from
a more general skepticism about the received wisdom that Boling was needed to avoid a
symbolic undercutting of Brown, and thus needed to allow Brown's normative message to
be accepted not just within the federal bureaucracy but also in the country at large.
According to that conventional view, the Court had to decide Boiling as it did, or else "the
apparent hypocrisy [of permitting federal segregation] would have made Brown all the
more unenforceable." McConnell, supra note 9, at 1162 n.14; cf. Amar, supra note 7, at
766-67 (describing Brown and Boling as partners in a three-legged race, such that one
cannot stand if the other falls). But the argument that Bolling was indispensible in order to
get the country, and especially the South, to accept Brown implies that the bogeyman to be
avoided-Southern refusal to accept Brown-was averted in any significant way by Bolling.
Perhaps the resistance to Brown would have been yet more massive had the Court not
ordered desegregation in Bolling- The rocks that white Southern racists threw at black
schoolchildren could have been bigger. Even with Bolling, however, implementing Brown
required military force and took a decade to do more than begin. In that light, the
possibility that Brown's opponents would add one more charge of hypocrisy to the invective
they already deployed seems like a marginal factor in the greater struggle over whether the
country would accept the norm Brown represents. I am therefore left wondering whether
legal academics have inflated the degree to which Bolling was of potential consequence in
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Assessing the impact of reverse incorporation on the ex ante behavior of government officials inclined to discriminate is thus anything but
straightforward. The doctrine's direct disincentives for discrimination
were not particularly potent, especially in the years of greatest change.
The more diffuse normative effects probably added little to a much more
powerful set of normative changes, legal and otherwise, occurring at the
same time.163 Again, none of this means that the rule caused no behavioral changes at all. But there are limits to the view of reverse incorporation as an agent of change, and the documented record of continued
unauthorized federal discrimination after 1954 shows that the primary
conduct at issue was not entirely eliminated. 164 It is therefore necessary
to look elsewhere to explain why the constitutional rule was so rarely enforced by the courts.
IV. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE

The observation that there are virtually no cases holding the federal
government to have engaged in unconstitutional racial discrimination is
only secondarily an observation about federal legislative, executive, or administrative conduct. It is primarily an observation about the behavior of
courts. No matter what the other federal branches do, there will be no
the broader struggle over segregation. Moreover, to the degree that it was consequential,
its consequences could have operated in both directions, because Boiling furnished
Southern segregationists with a new opportunity to charge the Court with hypocrisy. In
1957, the Georgia legislature passed a resolution calling on that state's congressional
delegation to impeach several Supreme Court Justices, and it listed the Court's doctrinal
innovation in Boling as a leading example of the misconduct warranting impeachment.
See 1957 Ga. Laws 553, 560.
The concern that a contrary decision in Boling would have adversely affected the
normative atmosphere in which Brown had to be implemented is not really about the
norms held by the Georgia legislature, which would have opposed desegregation
regardless of the outcome in Boling. It is about the views held by more moderate actors,
actors not firmly committed to either side of the struggle over segregation and who might
have been open to influence. This group might well have regarded a decision permitting
segregation in the District of Columbia as hypocritical. But that is not the only way to see
such an outcome. To the extent that one of the issues regarding Brown's legitimacy was
whether the Supreme Court had imposed its own preferences rather than doing what the
Constitution required, a contrary decision in Boling might have served as evidence that the
Court regarded itself as constrained by constitutional text. Among the relevant moderate
actors, Brown might therefore have enjoyed some marginal legitimacy gain as well as some
legitimacy loss had Boiling come out the other way.
I do not think we should be confident in our abilities to assess the practical impacts of
these various counterfactuals. Whatever the net impact of a contrary decision in Bolling
might have been, however, I suspect it would have been less than that of the forces
advancing the norm of Brown. The influences that prompted the executive branch to
desegregate the military and the civil service during the 1940s and that prompted Congress
to pass comprehensive civil rights legislation in the 1950s and 1960s would still have been
in force.
163. See generally Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King Years
1954-63 (1988) (giving comprehensive account of civil rights movement, including its
increasing strength and renown in the 1950s).
164. See supra notes 152-153 and accompanying text.
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judicial declarations of unconstitutionality unless the courts intervene.
Such intervention requires two judicial decisions: one to review cases on
their merits, and another to disapprove of the conduct being reviewed.
In Part V, I will show that the absence of cases finding unconstitutional
federal racial discrimination is largely a function of the federal courts'
substantive approval of the conduct of the other federal branches.
Before doing so, however, I will address the role of the judicial choice not
to review cases on their merits at all, or, if they do engage in some review,
the choice to review federal conduct deferentially. If the courts defer to
other federal decisionmakers, they will tend not to find federal conduct
unconstitutional.
One moderate form of judicial deference is the presumption that
government officials act in good faith. In equal protection cases, that
presumption is invoked to increase the showing that a litigant must make
in order to establish unconstitutional discrimination.1 65 By shaping the
requirements of proof in this way, the deference this presumption embodies reduces the likelihood that courts will find constitutional violations. 166 The presumption of good faith, however, is often afforded to
state actors as well as federal ones.1 6 7 It therefore might be more germane to a generally low number of cases finding unconstitutional discrimination than to a distinctively low number of cases finding such discrimination by federal officials.
In some quintessentially federal fields of action, however, judicial
deference takes a more extreme form. Consider the legal regulation of
the military, immigration law, and Indian law. These are all exclusively
federal areas, and they are all areas with clear records of racial discrimination by the federal government. 168 The federal courts have long afforded
the political branches broad or nearly unreviewable discretion to conduct
policy in these fields. 169 When courts defer to this extent, federal dis165. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (declining to hold
governmental action with a disparate impact unconstitutionally discriminatory); see also
Ortiz, supra note 138, at 1107, 1134-35 (showing how courts vary the levels of proof
needed to sustain equal protection claims across different substantive contexts).
166. See Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme
Court Rhetoric, 86 Geo. L.J. 279, 286 (1997) (arguing that courts adjust proof
requirements so as to make deliberate governmental discrimination a hard conclusion to
reach).
167. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987) (stating, in the course of
rejecting an equal protection challenge to the state administration of capital punishment,
that the courts "decline to assume that what is unexplained is invidious").
168. See supra notes 128-129 and text accompanying note 119.
169. For examples regarding military affairs, see, e.g., United States v. Stanley, 483
U.S. 669, 683-84 (1987) (declining to recognize subordinate's right to civil remedy for
constitutional violation by superior officer, because unique disciplinary nature of military
requires minimum of outside interference); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305 (1983)
(same); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981) ("The case arises in the context of
Congress' authority over national defense and military affairs, and perhaps in no other
area has the Court accorded Congress greater deference."). Regarding immigration, see
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896) ("No limits can be put by the courts
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crimination will not provoke judicial decisions holding discrimination unconstitutional. By forgoing judicial review in fields of law where federal
power is brought to bear on significantly nonwhite populations, the
courts help insulate the government from whatever restrictive power reverse incorporation might have.
Judicial deference may offer courts an attractive way to avoid calling
the government into disrepute when the government does in fact discriminate. In the decades since Boling, any finding of deliberate racial
discrimination by the government would entail a harsh moral indictment
of the official or officials responsible, and perhaps of the broader system
of which they were a part. Some courts might therefore prefer to avoid
making such findings. 170 Deference can offer a way out, excusing courts
from having to render factual judgments about what a government official did or legal-normative judgments about whether a government policy
71
is ultimately acceptable.'
upon the power of Congress to protect [against] . . . the advent of aliens whose race or
habits render them undesirable as citizens ....");Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130
U.S. 581, 606 (1889) ("[If Congress] considers the presence of foreigners of a different
race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and
security .. .its determination is conclusive upon the judiciary."). Regarding Indians, see
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) ("Plenary authority over the tribal
relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the
power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial
department of the government.").
170. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives: Voting
Rights and Remedies After F/ores, 39 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 725, 785 (1998) (arguing that
courts try to avoid the conclusion that legislators act on illicit motives when drawing
electoral districts); Donald H. Regan, Judicial Review of Member-State Regulation of Trade
Within a Federal or Quasi-Federal System: Protectionism and Balancing, Da Capo, 99
Mich. L. Rev. 1853, 1891 (positing that courts may be reluctant to make accusations of
malevolent racial motive, even if true); cf. Selmi, supra note 166, at 284 (arguing that
courts only find government discrimination when there is no plausible alternative to doing
so). This factor differentiates cases involving racial discrimination from cases involving
violations of First and Fourth Amendment rights. Violations of those rights can often be
seen as well-intentioned efforts to protect the security of the public or the health and
morals of its children, rather than as unambiguously immoral actions that all rightthinking Americans must condemn. It also differentiates discrimination against members
of racial minority groups from affirmative action, inasmuch as even many steadfast
opponents of affirmative action concede that the aims behind affirmative action are often
worthy or at least reasonable, even if the means used to attain those ends are not. See, e.g.,
Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2350 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) ("Because I wish to see all students succeed whatever their color, I share, in some
respect, the sympathies of those who sponsor the type of discrimination advanced by the
University of Michigan Law School. .. ").
171. The foregoing variations on the theme of judicial deference illustrate the range
of possible relationships between a court's choice to defer and its normative view that the
government's underlying substantive conduct is desirable, or at least not undesirable. It is
easy to understand the choice to defer when the court approves of the policy at issue, and
much deference probably does follow that model. In a recent article, Sarah Cleveland has
powerfully argued that the long-standing policies of deference with respect to immigration
law, Indian law, and the law of non-state territories grows out of the nineteenth-century
judiciary's broad sympathy with the imperial aspirations of the political branches. See
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It would be extremely difficult to know, however, whether this feature of deference played a significant role in reducing the number of
cases finding discrimination by federal officials. Indeed, the power of the
same antidiscrimination norm that might encourage judges to avoid declaring federal conduct unconstitutionally discriminatory could just as
well make judges especially keen to enforce equal protection when they
see it violated. 172 In part because it is hard to establish which of these
dynamics is a more powerful influence in judicial decisionmaking, it is
difficult to gauge the degree to which judicial deference explains the absence of cases finding racial discrimination by the federal government.
Similarly, it is hard to know the degree to which the presumption of good
faith reduces the number of cases finding unconstitutional racial discrimination by the federal government. The more extreme deference afforded in areas like the regulation of the military, immigration law, and
Indian law may do a good deal of work in the areas where it is applicable,
but those areas do not nearly encompass the wide range of activities undertaken by the federal government. Accordingly, although judicial deference probably does account for some increment of the absence of cases
finding reverse incorporation violations, a great deal of the pattern still
remains to be explained.
V. SHARED FEDERAL NoRMs

Suppose, counterfactually, that the Fourteenth Amendment had
been written with a slightly different text, such that the Equal Protection
Clause had always been addressed to the federal government as well as
the states. It does not follow that courts prior to 1954 would have held
that federal policies such as maintaining a segregated military or a segreCleveland, supra note 123, at 263-73. Not wishing to get in the way of policies advancing
manifest destiny, and not particularly inclined to be friendly to the litigants who wished to
challenge those policies (who were mostly nonwhite or, if white, then mostly nonProtestant and non-Anglo-Saxon), the courts opted to withdraw as much as possible from
fields related to the American bid to become a world power. See id. at 8-11, 74-81,
158-63, 278. On that understanding, the resulting doctrines of deference thus reflect the
courts' substantive approval of the political branches' conduct. But not all deference stems
from approval. Judges who defer in order to avoid exposing federal discrimination and
therefore calling the government into disrepute may be deferring out of a sense that the
government's conduct is normatively objectionable. At the very least, they defer out of a
sense that the government's conduct would be regarded as normatively objectionable by
some relevant audience.
172. Moreover, judges could invalidate practices as unconstitutionally discriminatory
and still limit the public airing of the most unpleasant facets of discrimination simply by
ratcheting the level of their official scrutiny up rather than down. One of the attractions of
the strict scrutiny standard in race discrimination cases has been that it authorizes courts to
invalidate discriminatory action without having to engage in substantive analyses of the
conditions of subordination to which African Americans have been subject. Instead of
judging discriminatory practices on their merits, a doctrinal framework affording state
actors almost no deference permits relatively bloodless declarations of unconstitutionality.
See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in
Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1470, 1477-78 (2004).
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gated civil service were invalid, even if they did not regard the military as
a subject of special deference. After all, the prevailing equal protection
regime prior to 1954 deemed segregation constitutional. A challenge to
the segregated military or civil service in 1910 or 1930 would surely have
failed. African Americans were permitted to join the army, and the segregation of military units by race would have been upheld as a reasonable
instance of providing separate but equal opportunities to people of different races. (There were no successful constitutional challenges to segregated state national guards prior to 1954, despite the fact that the Equal
Protection Clause governed action by states.) Accordingly, although the
absence of cases finding federal conduct to be unconstitutionally discriminatory is partly a matter of timing, reverse incorporation might not have
played a significant causal role in dismantling federal segregation even if
it had come ten or twenty years earlier.
The operative question is not whether the federal government ever
engaged in practices that would be considered unconstitutional discrimination today, or that would have been considered unconstitutional discrimination in 1954, but whether the federal government engaged in
practices that would have been unconstitutional discrimination at the
time they were practiced, had the practitioner been a state government
rather than the federal one. That question goes to the relationship, at
any given time, between federal practice and the views of the contemporary federal courts. After all, courts find constitutional violations when
173
the government's conduct runs afoul of judicially defined norms.
Even if the absence of successful equal protection claims proved an absence of unconstitutional conduct-which it does not-that absence
would only mean that federal practice was aligned with contemporary
constitutional doctrine, that is, that federal practice was broadly consistent with what the courts were willing to permit at the time when it occurred. As long as the federal courts' normative view of discrimination is
similar to the view held by the rest of the government, the courts will
rarely perceive the rest of the government as acting inappropriately. Instead, they will see federal action as consistent with constitutional values.
173. Constitutional violations sometimes occur without reference to judicially defined
norms, because courts need not always be the ultimate arbiters of constitutional meaning.
See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question
Doctrine and the Rise ofJudicial Supremacy, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 237, 237 (2002) (arguing
that the political question doctrine "forces the Court to confront the institutional strengths
of the political branches-and the Court's weaknesses-in resolving some constitutional
questions"); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: We the Court,
115 Harv. L. Rev. 5, 5-6 (2001) (arguing that Marbury "ventur[ed] only that it was proper
for the Court to interpret the Constitution without in any way suggesting that its
interpretations were superior to those of the other branches"); Robert C. Post & Reva B.
Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of
the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 Yale L.J. 1943 (2003) (arguing that we should move
away from current "enforcement model" to one that demonstrates more deference to
Congress). The present question, however, is about the absence of court cases finding
constitutional violations, so the focus is necessarily on constitutional violations as defined
by the courts.
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The phenomenon to be explained is thus not the nondiscriminatory behavior of the federal government but the rough correspondence between
the federal judiciary's orientation toward issues of racial equality and the
rest of the federal government's orientation toward those same issues.
According to the strand of scholarship that sees the federal courts as
enforcing national norms,1 7 4 stating the problem in this way comes close
to stating the solution. The federal courts are an arm of the federal government. Judicial nominees are drawn from a stratum of the population
with views that are mainstream among the elite, and the confirmation
process ensures that federal judges' views on important issues will be acceptable to a majority, or indeed a supermajority, of the officeholders in
the political branches. Unlike state officials, whose constituencies may be
to the right or the left of the national polity, the acceptable normative
boundaries for federal judges are shaped by the composition of the other
federal branches.1 7 5 It follows that Congress and the executive are likely
174. An important early statement of this idea is found in Robert A. Dahl, DecisionMaking in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as National Policy-Maker, 6 J. Pub. L. 279,
285 (1957) (arguing that the Supreme Court's views usually accord with the dominant
views among the nation's lawmaking majorities and never stay opposed to those views for
very long). More recently, important developments of thinking along these lines include
Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights, supra note 11, at 449-50 (observing that Supreme
Court decisions have reflected dominant public opinion on matters of race); Barry
Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 577, 580-81, 653-80 (1993)
(emphasizing existence of "dialogue" between courts and political branches rather than
imposition of judicial will on elected officials); Mark A. Graber, The Non-Majoritarian
Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 Stud. Am. Pol. Dev. 35, 36 (1993)
(expressing concern that judicial review not be viewed "as a practice that either sustains or
rejects the measures favored by lawmaking majorities"); Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore
Through the Lens of Constitutional History, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 1721, 1749-50 (2001) (noting
that many well-known Supreme Court reversals of state laws accorded with national
sentiment, and collecting cases); MichaelJ. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties Revolutions, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1, 6-18 (1996) ("Frequently the Court takes a strong
national consensus and imposes it on relatively isolated outliers. Infrequently the Court
resolves a genuinely divisive issue that rends the nation in half."); Barry Friedman, The
Politics of Judicial Review 2, 53-67 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (describing how interbranch forces require the Court to consider the
responses of the other branches of government). Scholars writing in this vein have taken
different positions on the question of whether equal protection jurisprudence follows this
model. Compare Friedman, Dialogue andJudicial Review, supra, at 604 n.135 (identifying
equal protection as the area in which the courts are perhaps most likely to act against the
wishes of the majority), with Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights, supra note 11, at
446-54 (presenting equal protection jurisprudence as largely consonant with the
majority's preferences).
175. The removal of Senator Trent Lott of Mississippi from the position of Majority
Leader in 2002 nicely illustrates these dynamics. Lott lost his position because he made
sympathetic remarks about fellow senator Strom Thurmond's support for segregation
several decades earlier. Carl Hulse, Lott Fails To Quell Furor and Quits Top Senate Post;
Frist Emerges as Successor, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 2002, at Al. Lott holds his Senate office
only because of the support of voters of Mississippi, and if his remarks are sufficiently in
keeping with the norms of that constituency, he will be able to retain that office. But for
the office of Majority Leader, Lott needed the support not only of Mississippi voters but
also of Republican senators from around the country. In the national polity, support for
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to hold antidiscrimination norms much like those held by the courts.
Under those conditions, the federal government is unlikely to enact official policies that the courts would regard as unconstitutionally
discriminatory.
For the same reason, a constitutional antidiscrimination rule will do
little independent work in policing deviant federal actors who depart
from official policy and discriminate on the basis of race. The shared
federal norms that shape the content of equal protection have also created statutory and administrative rules against discrimination. A government employee who can prove that he was fired on the basis of race has
little need for Bolling, because he can obtain relief through the enforcement of nonconstitutional rules. 176 To be sure, a great deal of discrimination goes undetected and unproven. But that problem is not solved by
adding a constitutional prohibition to statutory or administrative
prohibitions.
Reverse incorporation is consequential where the Constitution prohibits what other rules do not reach. In large part, this explains why
there are almost no cases finding unconstitutional discrimination against
racial minorities but there are cases finding violations of the equal protec177
Stattion rights of aliens, indigents, and persons born out of wedlock.
utory and administrative antidiscrimination rules are particular: They
prohibit discrimination on specifically enumerated bases. 178 The politisegregation is clearly out of bounds, and the Senate Republicans jettisoned Lott as their
leader. See id. (reporting that Lott was criticized across the political spectrum and that
Republicans feared keeping him as majority leader would damage their party). A federal
judge, like a Senate leadership officer, needs to be acceptable at the level of the national
polity, and for the same reason: Taking office requires the assent of a majority of the
Senate.
These dynamics have been part of the federal system since long before Lott's recent
travails, and indeed an almost exact though inverse precedent occurred shortly after
Bolling was decided. In 1956, nineteen of the twenty-two senators representing former
Confederate states signed a "Declaration of Constitutional Principles" denouncing Brown v.
Board of Education and its companion cases. The only three Southern senators not to sign
were the two from Tennessee, Albert Gore, Sr., and Estes Kefauver, and one senator from
Texas: Lyndon Johnson. See 102 Cong. Rec. 4460-64 (1956). Johnson was at the time
Majority Leader of the Senate, just as Lott was two generations later. By refusing to sign
this "Southern Manifesto," Johnson maintained his ability to serve in an office that relies
on a national constituency rather than only a statewide one. Indeed, two of the three nonsigners became the Democratic nominees for vice-president in the two succeeding
presidential elections: Kefauver in 1956 and Johnson in 1960. One cannot prove that
these senators would not have been nominated had they signed the Southern Manifesto,
but it seems exceedingly unlikely.
176. See infra notes 205-206 and accompanying text (discussing Tide VII and Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978).
177. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
178. The Civil Service Reform Act approaches being an exception, because it
prohibits discrimination "on the basis of conduct which does not adversely affect . . .
performance . . . ." 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(10) (2000). This prohibition appears to reach
discrimination on nonenumerated grounds, but it is not fully a catch-all provision, because
it reaches only nonenumerated conduct. Discrimination on the basis of status is still
prohibited only on specifically enumerated grounds.
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cal process and the powerful mainstream norm against official racial discrimination1 79 ensure that race is always one of those bases. But where
more peripheral kinds of discrimination are concerned, only a general
antidiscrimination rule can provide relief. That is not the work for which
reverse incorporation was invented, but the work it actually does is largely
limited to those contexts-and to the context of affirmative action.
A. Official Discrimination
Prior to 1954, a government could stay on the right side of equal
protection even if it practiced segregation. If the federal government
had continued official segregation in the military and the civil service after 1954, that policy might have been held unconstitutional under the
reverse incorporation doctrine. The issue never arose, because the political branches altered their official conduct shortly before the reverse incorporation doctrine was born.18 0 That timing was not entirely a coincidence. Brown and Bolling were products of a strengthened federal
commitment to antidiscrimination values in the first years after World
War II, and that commitment infused executive and legislative policy as
well as judicial doctrine.' 8 ' The branches of the federal government all
moved in the same direction at roughly the same time.
One should not overstate the harmony of this process. In the seventeen years between Truman's executive order desegregating the civil service and the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,182 each branch
underwent a similar evolution in its stance on general questions like the
acceptability of segregation and the importance of a federal commitment
to ending Jim Crow. Nonetheless, the branches did not all travel the
same path at exactly the same time, and each was often internally divided
as well.183 The internal diversity of each branch was great enough to include some elements whose views, if adopted by the branch as a whole,
could easily have caused conflict among the branches. Congress, for example, had a significant segregationist bloc during the 1950s and 1960s.
179. Senator Lott's recent fall from the position of Majority Leader is again a good
illustration. See supra note 175.
180. See supra notes 139-143 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., Dudziak, supra note 10, at 79-114 (discussing Truman administration
action such as integration of Armed Forces taken in context of American racism being
used for Soviet propaganda purposes); Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights, supra note
11, at 171-289 (describing shifting attitudes toward race after World War II, as well as
corresponding shift in Supreme Court decisions); Primus, Language of Rights, supra note
20, at 177-233 (discussing American concepts of rights and justice as developing in
response to Nazi and Soviet totalitarianism).
182. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973
to 1973bb-1 (2000)).
183. See Michael J. Klarman, Court, Congress, and Civil Rights, in Congress and the
Constitution (Neal Devins & Keith E. Whittington eds., forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at
5-9, on file with the Columbia Law Review) (showing how the legislature and the judiciary
have moved along parallel tracks on equal protection issues, albeit not in lockstep, as well
as showing the role of internal conflict in Congress).
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Had that bloc commanded a majority, Congress might have enacted legislation that the courts would have regarded as unconstitutional. The segregationist bloc was, however, never more than a powerful minority during these years. It was strong enough to frustrate many attempts at
Conserious civil rights legislation, but it was not strong enough to8 put
4
gress actively at odds with judicially defined equal protection.1
Similarly, different judges within the federal court system have often
held different views of what equal protection requires of the federal government. Judges and courts with more aggressive understandings of
equal protection tend to be more likely to hold federal practices unconstitutional. But the centralized and hierarchical organization of the
courts ensures that lower courts will not cause serious interbranch conflict if they depart from the judicial mainstream. Instead, lower courts
that espouse more aggressive antidiscrimination norms and sustain equal
protection claims against the federal government are frequently reversed
by higher courts.' 8 5 As a general matter, the higher courts are more
likely to track the norms of the national polity. Their judges are subject
to greater political vetting before confirmation, and a committee of three
or more judges is less likely to reach an outlier decision than a single
86
district judge acting alone.1
184. See Chen, supra note 125, at 97-101.
185. See, e.g., City of New York v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 34 F.3d 1114,
1128, 1130-31 (2d Cir. 1994) (ordering use of statistical sampling to reduce census
undercounting of minorities), rev'd sub nom. Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517 U.S. 1, 24
(1996); Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (holding that facially race
neutral District of Columbia police entrance exam constituted racial discrimination
because of disparate impact), rev'd, 426 U.S. 229, 238-40 (1976); Diaz v. Weinberger, 361
F. Supp. 1, 16 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (holding that Medicare eligibility rules for aliens stricter
than those for citizens violated Due Process Clause), rev'd on direct appeal sub nom.
Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-84 (1976). In cases where lower courts find equal
protection violations and higher courts reverse and rule for the government, the lower
courts mostly appear to be outliers in a politically liberal direction. The same dynamic can
occur, however, when the lower courts are outliers in a politically conservative direction. A
leading example is the pattern of decisions in employment discrimination cases in the first
years after passage of Title VII. In those years, district judges in Southern states frequently
attempted to evade the force of antidiscrimination laws through narrow legal constructions
and questionable findings of fact favoring defendants. Appellate courts-mostly the
Fourth and Fifth Circuits, but also sometimes the Supreme Court-responded with a set of
innovations that made it easier to reverse the district courts so as to allow the laws to
operate as Congress had hoped. See Alfred W. Blumrosen, The Law Transmission System
and the Southern Jurisprudence of Employment Discrimination, 6 Indus. Rel. L.J. 313,
342-50 (1984). In so doing, the higher courts acted as enforcers of national norms against
lower courts more closely tied to outlier local norms.
186. See Richard L. Revesz, Congressional Influence on Judicial Behavior? An
Empirical Examination of Challenges to Agency Action in the D.C. Circuit, 76 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1100, 1111-12 (2001) (describing how members of multimember judicial panels can
moderate the views of individual judges inclined toward less moderate results). Nearly a
hundred years ago, Congress acted on this theory by requiring that constitutional
challenges to state laws be heard by three judges rather than one judge alone. See ThreeJudge Court Act, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 557 (1910) (repealed 1976). The Three-Judge Court Act
was passed in response to the Supreme Court's holding in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123,
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Consider, as an example, the judiciary's internal conflict over the
issue of disparate impact during the 1970s. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
decided in 1971, the Supreme Court read Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 to prohibit facially neutral employment practices that had disparately adverse effects on members of disadvantaged racial groups. 187 Subsequently, a number of lower courts pushed one step further, holding
that the disparate impact standard was applicable notjust under Title VII
but as a matter of constitutional equal protection.1 8 8 Had the Supreme
Court adopted the disparate impact standard as a constitutional rule,
145, 159-60 (1908), that state officers were not immune from federal court injunctions in
constitutional cases. See Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 108-09 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (reviewing history of the Three-Judge Court Act).
This Act, which has since been repealed, see Pub. L. No. 94-381, § 1, 90 Stat. 1119 (1976),
was based on the theory that three judges acting together would be less likely to reach an
aggressive result than one judge acting alone.
187. 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971). That Gnggs was a statutory decision might seem to
imply that the disparate impact standard reflected the legislature's view of the appropriate
antidiscrimination norm, but that implication would be misleading. On the contrary,
Congress at that time lagged behind both the executive and the judiciary in the move
toward this more aggressive equality norm. On the most honest reading of the statutory
text (as it existed in 1971), Title VII did not create a cause of action for disparate impact
irrespective of discriminatory intent, but the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
and the courts read a disparate impact standard into the statute nonetheless. See Richard
A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 494,
506 (2003) [hereinafter Primus, Disparate Impact]. Congress did not exercise its statutory
power to countermand the interpretation of the other branches. Once again, Congress
was internally divided, and although forces that might have preferred a disparate impact
standard in 1964 were not sufficiently powerful to put one in the statute, the forces that
would have wanted to eliminate such a standard were not sufficiently powerful after Griggs
to reverse that decision. It was only twenty years after Griggs, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
that Congress codified a disparate impact standard in Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)
(2000) (permitting plaintiffs to state statutory employment discrimination claims on the
basis of disparate impact); Primus, Disparate Impact, supra, at 507-08. Even after 1991,
however, disparate impact is actionable under only a subset of federal antidiscrimination
legislation. Examples go both ways: The Americans with Disabilities Act reaches disparate
impact, see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3) (A) (2000), but the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act may not, see Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-634 (2000); Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993) (declining to
decide whether disparate impact theory is available under ADEA); id. at 618 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (noting that there are substantial reasons disparate impact analysis should not
apply under the ADEA). Title VI, which prohibits racial discrimination in any program
receiving federal funding, has no express disparate impact standard in its original text, and
unlike with Title VII, none has been read in by judicial construction. On the contrary, the
Supreme Court has construed Title VI to prohibit only intentional discrimination,
regardless of impact, see Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001), and Congress
has not second-guessed this reading. As the above discussion shows, the set of federal
antidiscrimination statutes is too varied to make it possible to say that Congress either does
or does not hold an antidiscrimination norm that reaches disparate impact.
188. See, e.g., Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409, 415
(7th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 957-58 n.2
(D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 732-33 (1st
Cir. 1972); Chance v. Bd. of Exam'rs, 458 F.2d 1167, 1176-77 (2d Cir. 1972); Hawkins v.
Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286, 1291-92 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'd en banc, 461 F.2d 1171,
1172-73 (5th Cir. 1972).
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many extant federal practices might have given rise to successful reverse
incorporation claims. An example is the disparate way in which federal
sentencing treats offenses involving powder cocaine and offenses involving crack cocaine. 18 9 That conflict between the branches never actually
arose, because the Supreme Court ultimately rejected disparate impact as
the constitutional standard for discrimination. Under Washington v. Davis, decided in 1976, courts will only grant relief on equal protection
claims if the discrimination complained of is formal or intentional. 90
With Davis, the question of what equal protection prohibited was resolved
in a way that did not threaten the federal government's policies with unconstitutionality, because the Court's vision of equal protection was not
more demanding than that held by the political branches. 19 1
To be sure, this resolution was not inevitable. Davis was a normative
choice, and a Supreme Court staffed by differentjudges might have chosen differently. 19 2 If a Democrat had won the presidency in 1968 and
appointed liberal justices to fill the seats to which Richard Nixon appointed Justices Burger, Powell, and Rehnquist, Davis might not have
been decided as it was. But the fact that things could have happened
differently should not obscure the tendency suggested by what actually
did happen: If the alignment between the branches is not inherent, it is
also not purely coincidental. If more Supreme CourtJustices had favored
the disparate impact standard, it probably would have been because of
189. The sentences for cocaine base (crack cocaine) are much heavier, and persons
convicted of possessing cocaine base are disproportionately black. See United States v.
Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 774, 797 (E.D. Mo. 1994), rev'd, 34 F.3d 709, 713-14 (8th Cir.
1994). Ajudiciary with a more aggressive equal protection norm might hold this disparity
unconstitutional, but the actual federal judiciary does not. See, e.g., United States v.
Carter, 91 F.3d 1196, 1198-99 (8th Cir. 1996) (rejecting equal protection challenge based
on sentencing rules giving 100 times as harsh a sentence for cocaine-base offense as for
powder-cocaine offense).
190. 426 U.S. 229, 239-48 (1976).
191. Again, this is not to say that the political branches never choose disparate impact
as the antidiscrimination standard. Sometimes they do. See supra note 187. It is only to
say that they have not adopted a general rule that would invalidate federal practices with
disparate impacts. A constitutional disparate impact standard, adopted by the judiciary,
would create just such a general rule.
192. Prominent scholars have argued that Davis rests on relatively non-normative
considerations like the relative competence of courts and legislatures. On this view, a
constitutional impact standard would simply be unworkable, such that the result in Davis is
compelled by common sense and the limits of the judicial capacity. See, e.g., Paul Brest,
The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination
Principle, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 26 (1976); see also Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,
272 (1979) (stating that the judiciary has limited ability to manage a standard that requires
a fair amount of empirical investigation). But this argument is probably overstated. Other
constitutional systems-Canada's, for example-have adopted impact standards in
constitutional law without dissolving into chaos. See British Columbia (Pub. Serv.
Employee Relations Comm'n) v. BCGSEU, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3, 4 (Can.) (rejecting
distinction between "direct" and "adverse effect" discrimination); Law v. Minister of
Human Res. Dev. (Minister of Employment & Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, 499
(Can.) (defining equality standard as focused on whether law has discriminatory purpose
or effect).
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general political trends that also would have made the legislative and executive branches more determined to avoid governmental practices with
disproportionately adverse effects on disadvantaged racial groups.
This understanding of the relationship among the federal branches
accounts for two other aspects of federal court decisionmaking on equal
protection claims. First, the few lower court cases in which reverse incorporation has been necessary for ending discriminatory conduct have involved discrimination not by Congress or major executive agencies, but
by local decisionmakers acting with federal authority. 193 Two of the three
194
cases involved administrative problems in the District of Columbia.
The discrimination in the third case was that of the local citizenry of Macon County, Alabama, acting without any check that a broader constituency might have offered. 195 These cases illustrate a classic problem of
principal and agent: Core federal authorities like Congress, the President, and the heads of the executive departments inevitably fail to exercise perfect control over every person on a sprawling organizational
chart. But the courts have never squared off against those core federal
authorities and held them to account on issues of racial discrimination.
Indeed, the most prominent judicial opportunities to invalidate overt racial discrimination by core federal authorities were spectacularly forgone
19 7
96
when the Supreme Court decided Hirabayashi' and Korematsu.
Those cases suggest that discrimination appealing enough to become official federal policy may commend itself to the courts as well. 19 8
A second aspect of federal court decisionmaking under reverse incorporation is even more telling. As noted in Part II, there is only one
case in which a court has actually invalidated a statute passed by Congress
or a regulation approved by a federal administrative agency on the
grounds that it unconstitutionally discriminated against members of racial minority groups. 199 That case is Simkins, in which the Fourth Circuit
193. See supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
194. Pedersen v. Burton, 400 F. Supp. 960, 963 (D.D.C. 1975) (striking a question
about applicants' "color" from marriage license applications); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F.
Supp. 401, 408-09, 514-18 (D.D.C. 1967) (reprising Boiling itself and ordering further
desegregation in fact of the local public schools).
195. Henderson v. Agric. Stabilization and Conservation Serv., 317 F. Supp. 430, 436
(M.D. Ala. 1970) (invalidating results of election for a local committee of the Agricultural
Stabilization and Conservation Service, based on vote dilution).
196. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
197. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see also supra note 38 and text
accompanying notes 36-39.
198. Even the Court's decision in Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944), which
granted habeas corpus relief to a Japanese American internee who argued that she had
been detained in violation of due process, did not describe the internment policy as
unconstitutionally discriminatory. Only Justice Murphy took that position. See id. at
307-08 (Murphy, J., concurring). In contrast, the Court continued to assume that the
relocation of persons of Japanese descent had been justified, and held only that detaining
a citizen after she had been individually shown to be loyal was beyond the scope of the
relocation authority. See id. at 302-04.
199. See supra text accompanying note 74.
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invalidated a federal law permitting the use of federal funds by segregated hospitals operated by states or private parties. 20 0 One might think
that in this instance at least, the different branches of the federal government were officially at odds with each other. In fact, however, the most
noteworthy thing about Simkins is its demonstration of unity among the
federal branches.
In the Simkins litigation, the United States intervened on the side of
the plaintiffs, asking the court to declare the law unconstitutional. 20 1 In
other words, the federal executive and the federal judiciary both took the
position that using federal money for discriminatory hospitals was unacceptable. Nor was Congress on the other side, even though the case formally presented a constitutional challenge to a congressional statute.
Simkins was, after all, decided in 1963. At the time of the decision, a
minority bloc within Congress was trying to prevent the majority from
enacting broad new civil rights legislation. 20 2 Within a year, in Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress would succeed in enacting a statutory ban on federal funding for racially segregated institutions. 203 The
Fourth Circuit's equal protection decision in Simkins thus operated in
tandem with the political branches rather than as a check upon them.
Moreover, no court invalidated the funding program struck down in Simkins before the other branches of the federal government were ready to
discontinue the practice of funding discriminatory programs.
B. UnauthorizedDiscrimination
The broad normative alignment between the federal courts and the
other branches plays a large role in explaining why there are almost no
cases striking down federal statutes or administrative regulations as unconstitutionally discriminatory. Official measures that would offend the
courts are also unlikely to be approved by the other branches, and discriminatory measures attractive enough to the political branches to be
enacted might well be upheld by the courts. Still to be explained, however, is the substantial absence of successful constitutional claims alleging
that federal officers discriminate in spite of official policy. After all, federal officers sometimes discriminate even when official policy forbids
it.

204

Unauthorized racial discrimination by the federal government is unconstitutional under Boling. Almost all such discrimination, however,
would also be prohibited without Boling. There is and has long been a
200. Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 966-67 (4th Cir. 1963).
201. See id. at 962.
202. See Chen, supra note 125, at 97-101.
203. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000)) ("No
person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.").
204. As previously, I will call this "unauthorized discrimination." See supra note 137
and accompanying text.
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constellation of statutory and administrative rules prohibiting racial discrimination by federal officials. Unauthorized discrimination may go unremedied in spite of these rules-some significant proportion of discrimination probably goes undetected or unproven in every context where it
occurs. But where racial discrimination can be demonstrated, nonconstitutional antidiscrimination rules are usually sufficient to supply a remedy.
A federal employee fired on the basis of race can seek redress under Title
20 5
V11
and the Civil Service Reform Act. 20 6 A plaintiff alleging that federal funds support the racially discriminatory activities of state governments or private entities can bring suit under Title VI. 20 7 Military officials are charged by regulation not to discriminate on the basis of race. 20 8
Federal lending agencies are statutorily required to adopt rules against
racial discrimination in the processing of loans. 209 Criminal defendants
in the federal system have a statutory right not to have their race considered as a criterion in sentencing. 210 These nonconstitutional remedies
make direct constitutional actions under the reverse incorporation doctrine much less necessary than they might otherwise be.
By making the constitutional remedy less necessary, this set of alternatives also makes the constitutional remedy substantially less available.
As a doctrinal matter, Bivens actions against federal officers are generally
not permitted when the government has provided an alternative legal
remedy.2 1 ' A federal employee who is fired for racially discriminatory
reasons, for example, may not bring a Bivens action alleging a violation of
Fifth Amendment equal protection, because she has statutory and administrative remedies under Title VII and the Civil Service Reform Act.2 12
Indeed, the Bivens remedy is preempted even if the alternative remedy
205. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b).
206. 5 U.S.C. §§ 2302, 7702 (2000). See generally Robert G. Vaughn, Merit Systems
Protection Board: Rights and Remedies (rev. ed. 2003) (laying out the rules and
procedures for enforcement within the federal civil service).
207. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (prohibiting the use of federal funds for racially
discriminatory facilities or programs).
208. See, e.g., Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2002), reprinted in 10
U.S.C.A. § 801 (Supp. 2003).
209. See 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(a) (14) (B) (ix) (2000). The recent settlement between the
Department of Agriculture and a certified class of African American farmers who alleged
discrimination in federal loan processing was reached under the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2000). See Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 86 (D.D.C. 1999);
see also supra note 120.
210. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5H1.10 (2003).
211. See, e.g., Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 386, 390 (1983) (denying Bivens remedy to
a government employee bringing First Amendment claim, because a comprehensive
remedial scheme already existed).
212. See Bush, 462 U.S. at 385-90 & n.25 (CSRA); Brown v. Gen. Serv. Admin., 425
U.S. 820, 835 (1976) (Title VII); see also United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987)
(holding no Bivens remedies available to military personnel, because of military's unique
disciplinary structure); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983) (same); Hicks v. Small, 69
F.3d 967 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that Veterans' Judicial Review Act preempts Bivens
actions for claims involving veterans' benefits); Purtill v. Harris, 658 F.2d 134 (3d Cir.
1981) (holding that Age Discrimination in Employment Act and accompanying
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does not provide all the relief that a Bivens action might; preemption
flows simply from the fact that another responsible branch of the government has made a calibrated judgment about how such problems are to be
resolved. 2 13 Bivens actions are accordingly available only for violations
not provided for by other remedial schemes. Because there is a thick web
of statutory and administrative remedies for racial discrimination by federal officers, there is little room for direct constitutional actions under
reverse incorporation and Bivens. By driving the enactment of preclusive
nonconstitutional remedies, the pervasive norm against deliberate racial
discrimination has thus prevented reverse incorporation from doing
practical work.
Bivens actions are, of course, not the only kind of constitutional suit.
A plaintiff could forgo a claim for damages and sue simply for declaratory
or injunctive relief, as the plaintiffs in Bolling itself did. But where the
discrimination prompting a victim to seek redress is unauthorized discrimination in violation of established policy, and if that established policy provides a method of redress short of a constitutional lawsuit, then
that alternative method of redress will probably be easier to pursue. The
administrative process is generally cheaper than litigation, and the complainant will not have to worry about overcoming the qualified immunity
doctrines that protect government officials sued for violations of constitutional rights. 2 1 4 Without the incentive of damage remedies making litigation more attractive, there may be little reason for the victim of unauthorized racial discrimination to pursue a constitutional lawsuit. Without
such lawsuits, reverse incorporation is not invoked.
C. NonracialDiscrimination
The idea that the different federal branches share basic norms might
imply that there should be few court cases striking down federal law in
any context, not just in the context of racial discrimination. In fact, that
implication is broadly consistent with some basic observations about the
volume of cases holding federal law unconstitutional. For most of the
twentieth century, the average rate of Supreme Court decisions invalidating congressional statutes was only about one per year. 215 That figure
understates the total volume of judicial invalidations of federal action,
because it does not include lower court decisions or decisions countermanding the actions of federal actors other than Congress. But in keepadministrative apparatus preclude Bivens actions by federal employees alleging age
discrimination).
213. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988) (refusing to create Bivens
remedies where Congress has provided "what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms
for constitutional violations").
214. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813-20 (1982).
215. See Jed Handelsman Shugerman, A Six-Three Rule: Reviving Consensus and
Deference on the Supreme Court, 37 Ga. L. Rev. 893, 1015-16 (2003) (listing cases). The
years since 1995 have departed sharply from that pattern. Between 1995 and 2002, the
Supreme Court struck down more than thirty acts of Congress. Id. at 893, 1017.

HeinOnline -- 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1032 2004

2004]

BOLLING ALONE

1033

ing with the analysis thus far, it does suggest that core interbranch conflict has been rare. The pattern could reflect either substantive
agreement between the branches or a frequent judicial choice to defer to
congressional judgment, and probably it reflects a mix of both. Whatever
its precise causes, however, this record shows that the infrequency of
court cases declaring federal law unconstitutional is a phenomenon that
transcends the issue of discrimination.
That said, when the Supreme Court does find Congress to have acted
unconstitutionally, it is not particularly unlikely for the subject matter to
be equal protection.2 16 In the time between Bolling and Davis, the Court
struck down acts of Congress on thirty-five occasions, 2 17 and six of these
were equal protection cases. They involved discrimination based on natu22 0
2 9
ral-born citizenship,2 18 place of residence, 1 birth out of wedlock,
other family status, 22 ' and sex. 222 Not one concerned race. Cases finding
racial discrimination are similarly rare at the level of unauthorized federal discrimination, even by comparison to cases finding discrimination
223
on nonracial grounds.
The difference is largely explicable in terms of the analysis already
given. First, there is no clear national norm on the question of the permissible distinctions between citizens and aliens, or people living in different locations, with the same power to command universal assent in the
federal mainstream as the rule against deliberate racial discrimination.
The issues have not consumed the same kind of national attention, and
reasonable people hold various views, if they have any developed views at
all.2 24 Second, and largely for the same reason, the apparatus of noncon216. In Part II, I showed that cases finding unconstitutional federal discrimination
against members of racial minority groups are in fact significantly more rare than cases
finding federal violations of the First and Fourth Amendments. That showing is consistent
with the present account. The statement that equal protection violations comprise a
respectable share of all cases finding unconstitutional federal behavior is a statement about
all equal protection violations, not just those where the discrimination is against members
of racial minority groups.
217. See Shugerman, supra note 215, at 1016-17 (listing cases).
218. Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
219. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
220. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
221. United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
222. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973).
223. See supra Part II.B.2.
224. In part because the questions of discrimination on these grounds have not
commanded the same kind of attention as discrimination on the basis of race or sex, there
is little data regarding public attitudes on these issues. Data that do exist on the question
of the acceptability of citizenship discrimination, however, suggest that there are areas of
substantial disagreement rather than the kind of clear consensus norms that condemn
overt discrimination against racial minority groups. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Citizens,
Strangers, and In-Betweens 192-93 (1998) (arguing that distinctive status of citizens has
been substantially eroded but noting efforts in the mid-1990s to curtail public benefits
available to noncitizens); John David Skrentny, Introduction to Color Lines: Affirmative
Action, Immigration, and Civil Rights Options for America 22 (John David Skrentny ed.,
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stitutional antidiscrimination rules is not as extensive in nonracial areas
as it is for race. All federal statutory and administrative antidiscrimina-

tion rules prohibit racial discrimination against minority groups, and
most, though not all, also prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex. But
there are many other bases of potential discrimination that most noncon-

stitutional rules do not address. Examples include alienage, indigency,
and birth out of wedlock. 2 25 In short, the nonconstitutional rules gener-

ally prohibit particular, named forms of discrimination, and the constitutional rule created through reverse incorporation is general. There are
therefore residual categories of discrimination where the constitutional
rule does independent work.

This way of understanding the greater frequency of cases finding
nonracial forms of federal discrimination reflects the fact that American
antidiscrimination norms have a core concern with race and then more
peripheral concerns with categories like alienage and indigency. The
general antidiscrimination norm is strongest at the core, and the doctrine
of reverse incorporation begins with the need to apply equal protection
in a core case. Once established, however, the principle does more work
at the periphery than at the core, because at the core there is general
agreement that discriminatory conduct is unacceptable. Moreover, the
contents of core and periphery are not static. A form of discrimination
may migrate from one category to the other over time. When a kind of
discrimination moves from the periphery to the core, the rate of constitutional cases finding federal discrimination on that basis should decline:
Having moved to the core, such discrimination would be prohibited by
official policy, leaving less work for a constitutional rule to do.
The pattern thus abstractly stated describes the path of federal sex
discrimination in the generation after Bolling. Ten years after that decision, in the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964, sex discrimination was not
of much concern. Title II of that Act, which prohibits racial discrimina2 26
tion in public accommodations, does not prohibit sex discrimination.
Neither does Title VI, which prohibits racial discrimination by programs
receiving federal funds. 22 7 Title VII does prohibit sex discrimination in

2001) (noting that citizenship is sometimes a necessary condition for participation in
affirmative action programs); Thomas J. Espenshade & Maryann Belanger, U.S. Public
Perceptions and Reactions to Mexican Migration, in At the Crossroads: Mexican Migration
and U.S. Policy 227, 258 (Frank D. Bean et al. eds., 1997) (showing that between 1993 and
1995, various polls found that between 28% and 63% of Americans favored laws
prohibiting illegal immigrants from using American schools and hospitals, while between
34% and 67% opposed such laws).
225. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000) (prohibiting the use of federal funds in
programs discriminating on the basis of race but not covering these other bases).
226. § 2000a (prohibiting discrimination in places of public accommodation "on the
ground of race, color, religion, or national origin").
227. § 2000d (prohibiting programs receiving federal financial assistance from
discriminating "on the ground of race, color, or national origin").
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employment, 228 but only through a famously ironic contingency whereby
a Southern opponent of the bill offered an amendment adding sex as a
prohibited ground of discrimination in hopes of scuttling the bill as a
whole. 229 Thus, in the mid-1960s, sex discrimination was not yet at the
core. By the end of the 1970s, however, there had been a significant migration, as reflected in the passage of legislation like Title IX23 0 and the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act. 231 The passage of those laws was part of a
shift in prevailing conceptions of discrimination whereby sex discrimina23 2
tion moved toward the core.
Not coincidentally, the judicial decisions holding the federal government liable for practicing sex discrimination in violation of the reverse
incorporation doctrine occurred precisely during those years. In 1961,
the Supreme Court upheld a state law requiring men but not women to
serve on juries, thus signaling that equal protection had little bite in the
sex context as of that date. 233 Change followed soon thereafter. The first
lower court case holding a federal law unconstitutional on grounds of sex
discrimination, Moritz v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,23 4 was decided
in 1972. The Supreme Court's three decisions holding federal law to
235
constitute unconstitutional sex discrimination-Frontiero v. Richardson,
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,23 6 and Califano v. Westcott237-were decided between 1973 and 1979. Several lower court cases also found federal sex
discrimination during those years. 238 After 1980, however, there appear
228. § 2000e-2 (prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of "race,
color, religion, sex or national origin").
229. See John J. Donohue III, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: An
Economic Perspective, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1337, 1337 (1989).
230. Pub. L. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2000)).
231. Pub. L. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000)).
232. On the interbranch dynamics attending the migration of sex discrimination
from the periphery to the core of equal protection, see Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel,
Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation after Morrison and Kimel,
110 Yale LJ. 441, 518-21 (2000) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Equal Protection].
233. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 58 (1961).
234. 469 F.2d 466, 470 (10th Cir. 1972) (striking down provision of Internal Revenue
Code that denied a tax deduction to men who had never married).
235. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
236. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
237. 443 U.S. 76 (1979).
238. See, e.g., Crist v. Crist (In re Crist), 632 F.2d 1226, 1234 (5th Cir. 1980) (striking
down provision of Bankruptcy Act providing for nondischargeability of alimony debts owed
to wives but not alimony debts owed to husbands); Carrasco v. Sec'y of Health, Educ. &
Welfare, 628 F.2d 624, 630 (1st Cir. 1980) (striking down provision of Social Security Act
favoring husbands over wives in community property jurisdictions, where income from
trade or business treated as husband's); Crawford v. Cushman, 531 F.2d 1114, 1125 (2d
Cir. 1976) (prohibiting Marine Corps from discharging a woman due to her pregnancy or
refusing her reenlistment due to her having a dependent child); Owens v. Brown, 455 F.
Supp. 291, 294 (D.D.C. 1978) (invalidating blanket ban on women serving on naval vessels
other than hospital and transport ships); Stevens v. Califano, 448 F. Supp. 1313, 1323 (N.D.
Ohio 1978) (striking down provision of Social Security Act that permitted families to
qualify for benefits based on unemployment of father but not on unemployment of
mother); Coffin v. Sec'y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 400 F. Supp. 953, 958 (D.D.C. 1975)
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to have been only four reported cases finding unconstitutional federal
sex discrimination. Two of those cases addressed peremptory challenges
to prospective jurors,2 39 one struck down a National Park Service rule
under which only men could play men in Civil War reenactments, 2 40 and
a facially discriminatory statute
one invalidated the continuing effect of
2 41
that Congress had long since repealed.
That there are so few such cases since 1980 is especially remarkable
given that the intermediate scrutiny applicable in constitutional challenges to sex-based distinctions is the most indeterminate of equal protection standards. 24 2 As compared with rational basis scrutiny and strict
scrutiny, each of which generally leads to a predictable outcome when
invoked, intermediate scrutiny seems to preserve a greater role for the
kind of judicial balancing that could cause cases to come out either way.
One might therefore expect to see a patchwork of results, with some practices being held valid and others struck down. That there has been no
process having eliminated
such patchwork is largely due to the political
24 3
most overt sex classifications from the law.
It seems, therefore, that during the years when the prevailing norm
in the federal government on the issue of sex discrimination shifted, it
shifted in the courts as well as in Congress, with both branches ending in
roughly the same place. Indeed, movement in Congress may have helped
shape the changing judicial view of the issue. 24 4 The move from legislative acquiescence in sex discrimination during the 1960s to legislative ac(striking down sections of Social Security Act tying benefits for husbands and widowers, but
not for wives and widows, to amount received from spouse in support).
239. United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1422 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Witham, 47 M.J. 297, 303 (C.A.A.F. 1997).
240. Cook v. Babbitt, 819 F. Supp. 1, 27 (D.D.C. 1993).
241. Aguayo v. Christopher, 865 F. Supp. 479, 490 (N.D. III. 1994) (striking down a
law in effect at the time of the plaintiffs birth in 1922, but repealed in 1934, under which
children born outside the United States were eligible for U.S. citizenship if their fathers
were U.S. citizens but not if their mothers were U.S. citizens).
242. See Clark v.Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (discussing two Supreme Court cases
that both applied intermediate scrutiny to statutory classifications burdening illegitimate
children, yet reached opposite conclusions).
243. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88
Cal. L. Rev. 1373, 1502-03 (2000). That purge, however, has not been total, and the
Supreme Court has upheld remaining instances of sex discrimination under intermediate
scrutiny. See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 70-71 (2001) (upholding 8 U.S.C. § 1409
(2000), which distinguishes between citizenship requirements for out-of-wedlock children
born abroad to American mothers and citizenship requirements for out-of-wedlock
children born abroad to American fathers). This case arose in the context of immigration
law and thus exemplifies both the relative normative concord between the federal
branches and the federal courts' choice to defer to the other branches. See supra Parts
IV-V.
244. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687-88 (1973) (Brennan, J., plurality
opinion) (noting, in course of argument for raising level of scrutiny for sex discrimination,
that Congress's view of sex discrimination as an evil to be remedied was of significance to
the Court); Post & Siegel, Equal Protection, supra note 232, at 515-21 (describing process
by which changes in Congress's position may have helped to change the Court's view).
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tion against sex discrimination in the 1970s was mirrored by the introduction of heightened scrutiny for sex discrimination in the courts. In that
period of transition, there was a flurry of successful sex discrimination
claims under reverse incorporation, as the courts sometimes moved faster
than other arms of the federal government. By the end of the 1970s,
however, the situation had stabilized. Statutory and administrative action
prohibited much sex discrimination, and the discrimination that remained has been largely tolerated by the courts. Reverse incorporation
has fallen out of use.
D. Affirmative Action
Finally, consider the difficult problem of race-based affirmative action. The Supreme Court has never actually struck down a federal affirmative action program, 245 but Adarand is about as close to a successor case
as Bolling has ever had, and lower federal courts have indeed invalidated
federal affirmative action programs. 246 Thus, the general alignment of
norms among the federal branches has not ensured constitutional safety
on every issue relating to race: Affirmative action programs are often exceptions to the overall pattern whereby the federal government is not
held to practice unconstitutional racial discrimination. Two factors consistent with the present account explain why.
First, equal protection doctrine has drawn a line between government action that uses express racial classifications and government action
that does not. Facially classificatory government action is automatically
subject to strict scrutiny24 7 and almost always invalid. 24 8 Actions that are
not facially classificatory fall under the rule of Washington v. Davis,
whereby strict scrutiny will not be applied unless the plaintiff can demonstrate a governmental intent to discriminate. 24 9 The standards for proving such intentions can be prohibitive. 250 It follows that facially classificatory government actions present the easiest targets for equal protection
245. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (remanding
case for application of strict scrutiny). The Tenth Circuit ultimately decided that the
amended program survived strict scrutiny. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d
1147, 1155 (10th Cir. 2000). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review that decision
but then dismissed the writ of certiorari and left the case undecided, thus letting the Tenth
Circuit's decision stand. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103, 105
(2001).
246. See, e.g., MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Ass'n v. FCC, 236 F.3d 13, 15-16 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (vacating FCC affirmative action rule upon finding said rule not narrowly tailored to
support compelling government interest); Lutheran Church-Mo. Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d
344, 356 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding FCC's diversity promotion unconstitutional).
247. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 235.
248. See PeterJ. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 4
(2000) (arguing that, in practice, the application of strict scrutiny amounts virtually to a
conclusion of legal invalidity).
249. 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976).
250. See Selmi, supra note 166, at 334-35 (observing that to prove intentional
discrimination is so difficult that "short of outright exclusion, the Court is unlikely to find a
violation").
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challenges. In almost all contexts, government actors have accordingly
abandoned the use of express racial classifications. The major exception
is affirmative action. Affirmative action, understood to mean a program
that uses racial preferences to improve the position of disadvantaged racial groups, will necessarily contain express racial classifications and
therefore be subject to strict scrutiny. In consequence, federal affirmative action programs occupy a constitutionally perilous position that al2 51
most no other federal programs occupy.
Second, and perhaps more fundamentally, there is no consensus
about the normative status of affirmative action. This lack of consensus
differs in some ways from that involved in issues of discrimination on
grounds like alienage or indigency. Notably, it is not a product of the
polity's not having thought much about the issue. It is instead a matter of
ongoing disagreement. The national polity is divided on the issue, 252 and
the Supreme Court is split down the middle almost as precisely as possible. Recent decisions leave a very small margin separating the permissible from the impermissible, 2 53 and a single change of judicial personnel
could scramble what little stability the doctrine presently enjoys. When a
norm is closely contested in the national political sphere and also in the
courts, the correspondence between the normative stances of the judiciary and the other federal branches produces not concord but uncertainty. The branches are still roughly in normative tandem, but it is a
tandem poised on a knife's edge. Even if only a short distance separates
the partners, they could be on opposite sides of the line.
251. This doctrinal architecture has pushed some commentators and government
officials toward formally race-neutral alternatives to traditional affirmative action. See, e.g.,
Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action, 88

Geo. L.J. 2331, 2364-81 (2000). These alternatives are formally race-neutral, but they
proceed from race-conscious motivations much like those underlying traditional
affirmative action. See id. at 2382-83; see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2442
(2003) (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that to admit that a diversity program benefits
different races differentially dooms such a program to strict scrutiny, while hiding
programmatic objectives might save the program from such review). One question that
emerges from the Supreme Court's most recent decisions on affirmative action is whether

the heightened awareness that such programs are racially motivated will make them less
constitutionally palatable than they previously seemed. See Primus, Disparate Impact,
supra note 187, at 543-44 & n.209.
252. In January 2004, a group called the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative launched a
campaign to place a question on the 2004 statewide election ballot that would, if approved,
ban the state of Michigan from practicing affirmative action. See Pete Waldmeir, Battle

Lines Drawn for Affirmative Action Drive, Detroit News, Jan. 11, 2004, at lB. The same
week,

while

campaigning

in

Iowa

for

the

Democratic

presidential

nomination,

Congressman Richard Gephardt pledged to double the magnitude of the federal
government's affirmative action programs for minority contracting. See The Democratic
Presidential Candidates in Their Own Words, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 2004, at A17.

253. Compare Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2417 (invalidating by 6-3 vote an affirmative action
program for admission to University of Michigan's undergraduate college), with Grutter v.
Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2347 (2003) (upholding by 5-4 vote a slightly different
affirmative action program for admission to University of Michigan's law school).
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The disagreement over affirmative action could be static and entrenched. If so, some uncertainty as to its constitutional status will persist
indefinitely. Small shifts in power in the various federal branches could
prompt the enactment or repeal of affirmative action programs, which
then might or might not be upheld by the courts. It is also possible, however, that the country is now experiencing a time of transition toward a
new consolidated national norm on affirmative action, analogous to the
transition in the mainstream norms on sex discrimination that occurred
in the 1970s. Like sex discrimination at that time, affirmative action is
now a sharply contested area of constitutional law as well as a significant
issue in the political process. It is possible, therefore, that uncertainty
and interbranch conflict will characterize affirmative action only for an
intermediate period, after which a clearer mainstream national norm will
emerge. After that point, courts would rarely second-guess the constitutionality of federal law.
If affirmative action does follow a path similar to that of sex discrimination, there is more than one place where the path could end. It could
end with the establishment of something like a color-blind norm, under
254
Or it
which affirmative action is prohibited or severely restricted.
could result in a greater relaxation of the color-blind idea, which would
give the government more latitude to act without judicial interference.
To be stable, this second alternative would require a significant change in
the meaning of strict judicial scrutiny, or alternatively, the overruling of
Adarand, but either of those obstacles could be overcome given the right
shift in underlying norms. The more restrictive alternative might achieve
stability more easily, because it would offer a clear rule to follow. If the
more restrictive alternative were to prevail, the trajectory of affirmative
action would turn out to be similar to that of sex discrimination, inasmuch as it would involve the consolidation of a norm prohibiting a kind
of governmental practice that had previously been permitted. The more
permissive outcome, in contrast, would be a case of the national polity's
contesting a practice that was once broadly allowed, and then ultimately
abandoning the contest, returning things to the status quo ante. Either
outcome is possible, just as it is possible that the question will remain a
matter of disagreement in both Congress and the courts. It is simply too
soon to know.
What is clear now, however, is that the issue giving rise to the closest
thing to a successor case to Bolling in the fifty years since 1954 is one on
which the national polity is deeply divided. That is not an accident. It is
the obverse face of the same interbranch dynamics that have made reverse incorporation a rule with almost no applications in the context of
discrimination against racial minorities-a context for which it has long
been thought indispensable.
254. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 Sup. Ct. Rev. 99
(describing and criticizing view that equal protection requires the government to take no
notice of race whatsoever).
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CONCLUSION

Reverse incorporation was not invented, and is not usually defended,
as a means of providing protection against discrimination for aliens, indigents, or others not presently covered by nonconstitutional antidiscrimination rules. It was certainly not developed with the intent of
preventing federal efforts to improve the position of disadvantaged minority groups. The major concern was, of course, the problem of discrimination against African Americans. But reverse incorporation has not in
practice done much observable work where that kind of discrimination is
concerned. Instead, the same forces that led the Court to deem racial
segregation unthinkable also helped make Boling the last case of its kind.
The account I have given of reverse incorporation's practical impact
is positive rather than normative. Its primary value is in improving our
understanding of how the constitutional system actually functions. It
does not resolve the normative question of whether the choice to apply
equal protection against the federal government is a correctjudicial innovation. It does, however, alter the terms in which that normative question
should be asked.
Obviously, any view that reverse incorporation is justified by the practical demands of normative necessity is harder to maintain once the claim
of necessity is called into question. 255 That said, the implications of this
Article's analysis can cut both ways on the normative issue. The root
problem of reverse incorporation's legitimacy is that it is understood as
an act of naked activism. 256 The signature complaint against judicial activism, however, is that judges should not substitute their own views for
those of the proper decisionmakers. 2 57 If reverse incorporation is unnecessary because the norm it established was already the mainstream position in the federal polity, some of the sting goes out of that complaint.
To be sure, such an account does not eliminate the problem. Legitimacy
may require that the appropriate decisionmakers decide rather than letting other decisionmakers impose an outcome, even if the outcome imposed is the one the appropriate decisionmakers would have chosen.
Nonetheless, the urgency of the charge of unwarranted activism is dulled
when the judicially imposed decision is consistent with what the national
polity has already established.
Similarly, there is no straightforward moral here about affirmative
action and the unintended consequences of judicial overreaching. Such
255. I say "harder" rather than "impossible" in part because proponents of the
necessity argument could fall back on the claim that judges in the generation of Boling did
not have the benefit of our hindsight and might have believed in good faith that reverse
incorporation was more necessary than it now appears to have been. For consideration of
that claim, see supra note 27.
256. See Ely, supra note 7, at 32-33 (calling theoretical underpinnings of reverse
incorporation "gibberish," and accusing Justice Warren of straining logic in applying equal
protection to the federal government).
257. See, e.g., Learned Hand, The Bill of Rights 73 (1958) ("For myself it would be
most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, even if I knew how to choose
them, which I assuredly do not.").
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a story would be misleadingly easy to tell: Reverse incorporation, a feat of
Warren Court activism, turns out to impede rather than advance the liberal position on the only major racial equality issue where it has really
mattered. If the Court had only been more willing to leave change to the
political branches, we would not have Adarand today. But that perspective is too simplistic, and not only because there is a normative perspective from which Adarand is an appropriate fulfillment of the values underlying Brown and Boling rather than a bitter irony betraying them.
The idea that federal racial classifications should be constitutionally
suspect was not a momentary impulse indulged to solve a local problem
in Bolling. Nor was it even an innovation of the Warren Court. On the
contrary, it was already present a decade or two before in cases like Korematsu and CaroleneProducts. It bore the label of due process rather than
equal protection, but that distinction need not make much difference if
the substance of the rule was the same. Once that principle was established, a court holding the view that racial classifications are equally suspect no matter which racial group or groups is benefited-that is, a court
that would decide Croson-could easily have reached the decision in
Adarand. It does not follow, of course, that Adarand is correct. For one
thing, Croson could be wrong. Alternatively, the supporter of affirmative
action who is willing to disavow Boling could be just as willing to disavow
the relevant passages in Carolene Products and Korematsu. But the argument looks different once we see that it requires us to revisit not just a
single case decided under conditions of extreme political pressure, but
rather several cases decided over the course of sixteen years. Reverse incorporation, I suggest, is less an act of judicial will generating practical
consequences for government conduct than an artifact of a broader
change in constitutional thought.
Boling's statement that imposing different constitutional equality
standards on the state and federal governments would be "unthinkable"2 5 8 was probably intended in a normative sense, but "unthinkability"
could also describe a cognitive condition. By 1954, elite American opinion had come to see freedom from racial discrimination less as a limitation on the power of a particular government and more as a universal
right. 259 As an analytic matter, individual rights and limitations on government powers may be simply obverse descriptions of the same relationships. But the rise of the paradigm of universal rights made it increasingly unwieldy, as an intuitive matter, to maintain a doctrinal structure on
which it mattered which government engaged in such discrimination. In
a descriptive as well as a normative sense, such distinctions were no
longer as "thinkable" as they had once been. In a way, therefore, Bolling
is the very opposite of alone. It is the only case of its kind, but it is inseparable from the larger transformation that produced it.
258. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
259. Primus, Language of Rights, supra note 20, at 180-97.
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